Chicago,  1894  ^ 


THE    EXPEDITIONS    AGAINST    FORT    FISHER 
AND    WILMINGTON. 

By  EDSON  J.  HARKNESS. 
[Read  February  13,  1890.] 

A  MONG  all  the  seaports  that  supplied  the  Confeder- 
-*■■*•  ates,  Wilmington  was  the  one  most  essential  to 
Richmond.  As  the  crow  flies,  it  is  two  hundred  and 
twenty  miles  south  of  the  Virginia  capital,  one  hundred 
and  fifty  miles  from  Charleston,  two  hundred  and  twenty- 
five  miles  from  Savannah,  and  three  hundred  and  seventy 
from  Atlanta.  Here  were  carried  on  the  principal  opera- 
tions of  the  blockade-runners.  In  but  little  more  than  a 
year  prior  to  January  15,  1865,  the  ventures  of  Eng- 
lish capitalists  and  speculators  with  Wilmington  alone 
amounted  to  sixty-six  million  dollars ;  the  exports  of 
cotton  were  sixty-five  million  dollars  ;  while  three  hundred 
and  ninety-seven  vessels  ran  the  blockade.  For  nearly 
three  years  one  of  the  largest  squadrons  afloat,  under  Act- 
ing Rear-Admiral  Lee,  had,  amidst  great  difficulties,  held 
on  at  all  seasons  to  the  bars  at  the  old  and  new  inlets  of 
Cape  Fear  River,  twenty  miles  south  of  Wilmington,  and 
succeeded  in  maintaining  the  closest  blockade  ever  at- 
tempted on  any  coast.  They  captured  or  destroyed  ves- 
sels to  the  value  of  perhaps  ten  million  dollars.  The  shores 
were  strewn  with  wrecks,  the  captains  generally  beaching 
and  burning  their  craft  to  prevent  the  Federals  from 
gaining  prize-money.  But  great  as  were  the  English  losses, 
for  each  shipwreck  two  new  vessels  were  built  on  an  im- 
proved plan ;  for  so  great  were  the  profits  of  one  successful 
voyage  that  the  English  adventurers,  provided  with  good 
pilots,  readily  took  all  risks,  which,  in  comparison  with  those 
incurred  by  blockaders,  amounted  practically  to  nothing. 


I46        MILITARY  ESSAYS  AND  RECOLLECTIONS. 

For  in  these  operations  the  advantages  were  all  on  the 
side  of  the  blockade-runners.  Such  was  the  nature  of 
the  outlets  that  they  required  watching,  north  and  south, 
for  sixty  miles.  The  depth  of  water  at  the  bar  never 
exceeded  ten  feet.  If  our  cruisers  lay  close  to,  they  were 
in  danger  of  the  currents  carrying  them  into  breakers  and 
destruction.  The  average  gunboat  had  too  deep  draft  to 
follow  the  blockade-runner,  and  the  slowness  of  our  ships 
left  little  chance  of  catching  her.  Though  sometimes 
intercepted  and  driven  back  to  the  Bermudas,  they  suc- 
ceeded eight  times  in  ten.  Toward  the  last,  the  English 
began  building  those  vessels  of  steel,  —  long,  narrow,  and 
shallow,  —  which  were  capable  of  great  speed,  and  could 
cross  at  any  hour;  for  at  night,  range-lights  were  kept 
burning.  So  regular  were  their  trips  that  Wilmington 
counted  on  their  arrival  almost  as  confidently  as  if  they 
were  mail-packets. 

After  the  appointment  of  Admiral  Porter,  September 
22,  1864,  a  new  system  was  adopted,  which  took  the  con- 
traband traders  by  surprise.  He  furnished  every  cruiser 
with  a  chart,  on  which  were  drawn  two  half-circles  close 
to  the  bars.  Off  each  outlet  ten  vessels  were  ranged  in 
a  half-circle.  About  ten  miles  southward  from  Cape  Fear 
extend  Frying-Pan  Shoals  ;  here  was  drawn  another  half- 
circle,  radiating  about  twelve  miles,  and  here  twenty  of 
the  fastest  ships  took  station,  averaging  five  miles  apart, 
and  communicating  by  signal  from  end  to  end.  A  third 
half-circle,  swung  from  Beaufort  (sixty  miles  north),  de- 
scribed an  arc  one  hundred  and  thirty  miles  at  sea,  and 
struck  Cape  Fear.  Along  this  line  ships  were  stationed 
about  eight  miles  apart.  If  a  blockade-runner  came  from 
Wilmington  before  daylight,  she  was  seen  by  Circle  Two  ; 
and,  in  case  of  breaking  past,  was  chased  by  Circle  Three. 
Should  a  vessel  approach  these  outermost  sentries  to  run 
into  Wilmington  just  before  daylight,  they  chased  her  off; 
if  after  dark,  and  she  eluded  them,  she  was  caught  by  the 
central  contingent.     As  a  result,  in  thirty-seven  days  six 


EXPEDITIONS  AGAINST  FORT  FISHER,  ETC.       1 47 

million  dollars  of  property  was  seized  or  destroyed,  and 
captured  English  steamers  arrived  at  Hampton  Roads,  on 
an  average  of  nearly  one  a  day.  It  was,  however,  hardly 
feasible  to  continue  such  a  stringent  blockade,  —  though, 
if  maintained,  in  three  months  Wilmington  would  have 
been  abandoned,  —  for  the  Government  must  have  soon 
put  most  of  the  squadron  elsewhere,  and  resumed  the 
former  method  of  investment. 

An  occurrence  after  the  fall  of  Fort  Fisher  illustrates 
the  difficulty  of  blockading.  Two  English  boats  arrived 
at  night.  Their  commanders,  unaware  of  the  situation, 
worked  their  way  through  all  our  fleet  and  came  into  the 
river  unobserved.  They  then  announced,  by  signals,  their 
arrival.  A  captured  contraband  understood  the  signals, 
and  informed  General  Terry  what  reply  would  bring  them 
in.  The  signal  was  given,  and  the  officers  came  in, 
entirely  unconscious  they  were  falling  among  Federal 
forces.  Even  after  they  entered  the  fort,  they  enjoyed 
conversation  for  some  time  before  suspecting  that  Union 
generals  were  their  hosts.  They  were  finally  informed 
that  their  vessels  and  cargoes  were  prizes. 

Whoever  held  the  shore  north  of  New  Inlet  kept  the 
key  of  this  contraband  mart.  For  more  than  twenty 
miles  above  its  mouth,  Cape  Fear  River  flows  nearly 
parallel  with  the  coast,  forming  a  peninsula  twenty-three 
miles  long,  but  of  varying  width.  Its  southeast  end  is 
Federal  Point,  —  the  peninsula  one  mile  northward  being 
a  mere  beach,  less  than  half  a  mile  from  sea  to  river,  and 
entirely  open  to  bombardment.  Three  miles  northward 
the  breadth  is  one  mile,  and  the  east  bank  is  six  feet  high. 
At  the  fourth  mile  the  width  becomes  one  and  a  half 
miles.  At  the  north  end  the  peninsula  is  cleft  by  Mason- 
boro  Sound,  extending  sixteen  miles  south.  The  area 
between  New  Inlet,  the  river,  the  sound,  and  the  Atlantic, 
is  sandy ;  the  ground  never  rises  more  than  fifteen  feet 
above  high  water,  is  heavily  timbered  in  dry  regions,  and 
J?  abounds  in  wooded  and  almost  impassable  swamps.     The 


I48         MILITARY  ESSAYS  AND   RECOLLECTIONS. 

beach  is  bordered  by  firm  land  about  three  hundred  yards 
wide.  The  river  bank  forms  a  natural  sheltered  way,  and 
on  its  summit  runs  the  Wilmington  road.  Not  quite 
seven  miles  north  was  Sugar  Loaf,  a  high  sand-hill,  where 
there  was  an  intrenched  Confederate  camp. 

Early  in  the  war  unimportant  works  were  erected  on 
this  peninsula.  A  squadron  of  light-draft  gunboats  could 
have  passed  them  and  taken  possession  of  the  river,  then 
and  there  enforcing  the  blockade.  What  might  have 
been  prevented  grew  into  a  series  of  fortifications  so 
formidable  as  to  render  most  difficult  their  reduction. 

The  first  tracings  were  made  by  Colonel  S.  L.  Fremont, 
a  native  of  New  Hampshire,  a  graduate  of  West  Point 
under  the  name  of  Fish,  and  once  an  army  officer.  (He 
was,  in  1875,  engineer  on  the  Wilmington  &  Weldon 
Railroad.)  Under  successive  engineers,  construction 
continued  for  many  months  ;  General  Whiting,  C.  S.  A., 
another  graduate  of  the  national  military  academy,  and 
once  an  officer  of  United  States  Engineers,  devoting  all 
his  labor  and  skill  for  two  years  to  the  defences  of  fort 
and  port,  until,  in  1864,  it  attained  colossal  proportions. 

Where  the  peninsula  is  seven  hundred  yards  wide,  stood 
a  land-face  four  hundred  and  eighty  yards  in  length,  in- 
tended to  resist  attack  from  the  north.  Beginning  at  the 
river,  a  stockade,  fronted  by  a  shallow  ditch  and  a  marsh, 
ran  sixty  feet  east.  Owing  to  remoteness  and  shelter,  it 
always  remained  nearly  intact.  At  its  seaward  end  was 
a  sallyport  with  a  bridge  15  X  10,  the  Wilmington  road 
entering  through  this  gate.  Here  the  earthwork  began. 
This  consisted  of  a  half-bastion  on  the  left,  a  connecting 
curtain,  with  a  full  bastion  at  the  right.  The  parapet 
was  twenty-five  feet  thick,  and  averaged  twenty  feet  in 
height.  From  the  interior  crest  seventeen  traverses  ran 
back  at  right  angles  for  distances  varying  from  thirty  to 
forty  feet,  overtopping  the  parapet  by  ten  feet,  and  having 
thicknesses  of  eight  or  twelve  feet.  These  traverses  shel- 
tered from  enfiladement,  and  were  the  largest  known.     In 


EXPEDITIONS  AGAINST  FORT  FISHER,  ETC.        1 49 

each  was  an  alternating  magazine,  ventilated  by  an  air- 
chamber,  and  passage-ways  penetrated  the  interior  bomb- 
proofs.  On  the  left  half-bastion,  however,  the  traverses 
were  only  about  twenty-five  feet  long.  Between  the  tra- 
verses were  compartments  for  gun-platforms  and  guns  at 
least  twelve  feet  above  the  interior  level,  having  separate 
ramps  and  stairs  from  a  parade-ground  inside,  mounting 
each  one  or  two  large  barbette  guns,  and  holding  from  two 
hundred  to  three  hundred  infantry.  The  vast  amount  of 
earth 'was  partly  obtained  from  a  shallow  exterior  ditch, 
but  mainly  from  the  interior.  About  fifty  feet  in  front, 
the  palisade  extended  to  the  ocean,  with  loopholes  and  a 
banquette ;  it  had  between  the  river  and  the  left  of  the 
parapet  a  position  for  guns,  and  also  another  between 
the  bastions.  The  flanking  bastion  at  the  right  of  the 
land-front  was  more  than  a  quarter  of  a  mile  east  from  the 
two  compartments  nearest  the  river,  and  was  for  that 
reason  practically  useless  for  an  enfilading  fire  when  the 
attack  was  made  on  those  compartments.  The  vertical 
vastness  and  width  of  the  parapet  —  five  muskets'  length 
—  gave  a  wide  space  at  the  foot,  below  and  inside  any 
possible  fire  from  the  crest.  The  fort  wall  once  gained, 
the  bastion  would  cover  assault  as  truly  as  defence. 

In  the  centre  of  this  front,  a  bomb-proof  postern  ex- 
tended through  traverse  and  curtain,  its  outward  opening 
covered  by  a  small  redan  for  two  field-pieces  to  enfilade 
palisade  and  parapet.  The  traverses  were  generally  bomb- 
proofed  for  men  or  magazines  ;  the  slopes  of  the  curtain, 
for  five  feet  nine  inches  above  the  compartment  floorings, 
either  were  revetted  with  marsh-sod  or  covered  with  grass, 
and  inclined  at  an  angle  of  forty-five  degrees.  This  incli- 
nation was  reduced  under  fire  to  thirty  degrees,  while 
revetments  disappeared.  The  strength  of  the  earthwork, 
after  bombardment,  remained  about  the  same  as  previ- 
ously. On  this  front  stood  twenty-one  heavy  guns  and 
three  mortars.  Two  hundred  yards  north  of  Fort  Fisher 
were  three  formidable  lines  of  torpedoes,  each  containing 


I50        MILITARY  ESSAYS  AND  RECOLLECTIONS. 

about  one  hundred  pounds  of  powder,  about  eighty  feet 
apart,  and  capable  of  ploughing  a  furrow  one  hundred 
yards  wide. 

From  the  east  end  of  the  land-face  ran  a  wall  at  right 
angles,  parallel  with  the  beach,  and  thirteen  hundred 
yards  long.  It  prevented  Federal  cruisers  from  entering 
New  Inlet,  and  troops  from  gaining  Federal  Point.  This 
sea-front  consisted  of  a  series  of  batteries  mounting 
twenty-four  guns,  connected  by  a  strong  infantry  para- 
pet, and  employing  traverses,  generally  bomb-proofed, 
though  many  were  not  complete.  There  was  neither 
moat  nor  palisade,  as  shifting  sands  rendered  the  former 
impossible.  The  batteries  were  fewer  and  at  greater  in- 
tervals. Nearly  two-thirds  of  a  mile  southwest  from  the 
northeast  bastion,  Mound  Battery  —  or  Battery  Lamb,  as 
it  was  named,  for  its  originator  —  rose  sixty  feet  in  height, 
commanding  the  channel  inside  the  bar  close  to  the 
beach.  In  the  terre  plein,  say  fifteen  hundred  to  two 
thousand  feet  from  the  north  wall,  rifle-pits  stretched 
obliquely  across.  There  was  no  fortification  along  the 
river,  but  at  Federal  Point,  Battery  Buchanan,  a  small, 
ellipse-shaped  work,  garrisoned  by  marines  with  four 
guns,  guarded  the  channel.  The  floor-space  of  thirty 
bomb-proofs,  magazines,  and  passages  was  fourteen  thou- 
sand five  hundred  square  feet,  not  including  the  main 
magazine,  whose  dimensions  could  not  be  obtained. 

Such  was  the  largest  of  Southern  fortifications.  On  July 
4,  1862,  it  had  been  merely  several  detached  earthworks, 
with  one  casemated  battery,  of  palmetto  logs  and  sand, 
mounting  four  guns  and  one  heavy  gun.  The  sea-front 
was  constructed  first,  —  the  Army  of  Wilmington  having 
to  prevent  investment  from  land,  —  and  the  frigate  "Minne- 
sota "  could  have  destroyed  it  in  two  hours.  In  Decem- 
ber, 1864,  it  was  far  from  complete.  Yet  Admiral  Porter 
says  :  "  I  have  visited  Fisher  since  [its  capture],  and  find 
its  strength  greatly  beyond  what  I  had  conceived.  An 
engineer  might  be  excusable  for  saying  it  could  be  cap- 


■             jw.        Scale  of  Plan        32ort-ira*h 
I 1 2P — I r-     I      T — i — ^ — t— -^* 


152         MILITARY  ESSAYS  AND  RECOLLECTIONS. 

tured  only  by  regular  siege.  The  work  was  really  stronger 
than  the  Malakoff."  In  January,  1865,  Beauregard  pro- 
nounced Fort  Fisher  impregnable. 

No  commander  could  demand  better  and  safer  oppor- 
tunities to  defend  a  fort  from  the  outside  than  Fisher 
afforded.  The  river  channel,  three-quarters  of  a  mile 
west  from  the  work,  allowed  an  unobstructed  view  from  a 
ship  of  both  its  interior  and  of  enemies.  Signal  officers 
at  Battery  Buchanan  and  the  Mound  would  be  compara- 
tively free  from  danger.  Water  communication  from 
Sugar  Loaf  to  Fort  Fisher  occupied  but  thirty  minutes. 
The  east  bank,  from  one  hundred  yards  north  of  Fort 
Fisher,  formed  a  perfect  defence  from  hostile  fleets. 
From  Battery  Holland,  half  a  mile  north,  a  series  of  bat- 
teries, curtains,  and  sandhills  extended  to  the  south  end 
of  Masonboro  Sound,  protecting  infantry  against  marine 
bombardment.  In  the  face  of  a  few  thousand  well-handled 
and  determined  troops,  moving  there  unobserved,  both 
nature  and  art  had  made  landing  there  impossible.  So 
thought  Beauregard,  Longstreet,  and  Whiting. 

The  commander  of  these  defences  was  William  Lamb, 
colonel  of  the  Thirty-sixth  North  Carolina  Infantry,  who 
assumed  control  July  4,  1862.  Before  December  10,  1864, 
the  garrison  consisted  of  four  companies  of  infantry,  one 
light  battery,  and  the  gun  crews,  —  less  than  seven  hun- 
dred men  in  all,  with  reserve  of  less  than  one  thousand 
at  Masonboro  Sound.  Major-General  Whiting  had  been 
in  command  at  Wilmington  until  Jan.  13,  1865,  when  his 
sense  of  duty  led  him  to  the  post  of  danger.  Although 
ranking  Lamb,  he  declined  the  proffered  precedence,  being 
unwilling  to  deprive  Lamb  of  the  glory  that  a  successful 
defence  might  bring,  and  merely  acting  as  counsellor.  The 
armament  comprised  fifty-seven  smooth-bores  and  twenty- 
eight  rifles.  There  were  many  monster  Columbiads,  and 
many  superb  rifles  of  heavy  calibre.  London  was  repre- 
sented by  a  one  hundred  and  fifty  pounder  Armstrong.  It 
was  a  piece  of  magnificent  finish,  having  a  carriage  of  rose- 


EXPEDITIONS  AGAINST  FORT  FISHER,  ETC.        I  53 

wood  and  mahogany,  and  on  the  trunnion  its  maker's  name 
in  full,  and  the  "  broad  arrow."  A  post-captain  of  the  Royal 
Navy  managed  this  gun  when  the  first  attack  occurred. 

Ever  since  the  winter  of  1861-1862,  Secretary  Welles 
had  endeavored  to  gain  the  co-operation  of  the  War 
Department  in  a  joint  attack  on  Fort  Fisher  by  both 
navy  and  army.  Owing  to  shoal  water,  a  purely  naval 
attack  against  Wilmington  could  not  be  undertaken. 
Had  there  been  water  enough  for  broadside  ships  of  the 
"Hartford's"  class,  Wilmington  would  have  shared  the 
fate  of  New  Orleans,  Port  Royal,  and  Mobile.  In  Sep- 
tember, 1864,  Secretary  Welles  made  another  appeal  to 
the  War  Department,  and,  encouraged  by  Grant  to  ex- 
pect assistance,  began  to  assemble  a  suitable  force.  He 
tendered  the  command  of  the  North  Atlantic  blockading 
squadron  to  Farragut,  and  stated  to  him,  on  September  5, 
that  Grant  thought  troops  could  be  spared  and  moved  by 
October  1.  It  appears  as  if  the  methods  actually  pursued 
largely  followed  Grant's  idea.  But  failing  health  pre- 
vented Farragut  from  accepting,  and,  on  September  22, 
Rear-Admiral  Porter  relieved  Acting  Rear-Admiral  Lee. 
Porter  had,  on  the  Mississippi,  been  daring  and  efficient, 
showing  a  perfect  understanding  of  his  profession,  and 
holding  that  to  insure  great  successes  great  risks  must  be 
taken.  He  asked  for  eight  thousand  soldiers,  and  ships 
enough  to  fire  one  hundred  and  fifty  guns  in  broadside. 
It  was  then  thought  that  Fort  Fisher  mounted  seventy- 
five  guns,  and  the  proportion  of  two  to  one  was  really 
small,  since  the  naval  fire  would  occur  on  surging  seas 
and  wooden  ships,  while  the  land  fire  came  from  heavy 
and  solid  earthworks.  It  was  arranged  before  Septem- 
ber 1  that  the  attack  should  be  made  October  1,  but 
subsequently  it  was  postponed  to  October  15.  Grant  de- 
cided at  once  to  send  the  requisite  troops  as  soon  as  ships 
were  ready.  By  October  15  about  one  hundred  ships, 
mounting  six  hundred  and  nineteen  guns,  had  assembled, 
other  squadrons  being  thereby  heavily  depleted.     This 

VOL.  II.  —  IO 


154         MILITARY  ESSAYS  AND  RECOLLECTIONS. 

armada  could  have  but  one  objective  point,  and  hence 
became  matter  of  common  talk.  Southern  journals  dis- 
cussed the  expedition,  and  Lee  sent  word  that  Fort  Fisher 
must  be  held,  or  that  his  supplies  would  fail.  To  Lamb 
he  telegraphed  (date  unknown)  :  "  If  Fisher  falls,  I  shall 
have  to  evacuate  Richmond."  Bragg  was  sent  to  Wil- 
mington to  prepare  for  defence.  This  caused  postpone- 
ment of  the  attack  until  the  latter  part  of  November. 
Secretary  Welles,  on  October  28,  pleaded  urgently  with 
President  Lincoln  to  hasten  the  military  co-operation. 
The  loss  of  two  invaluable  weeks  since  the  fleet  was  able 
to  move,  severely  tried  the  patience  of  both  Porter  and 
Welles.  The  detention  of  so  many  vessels  from  blockade 
and  cruising  caused  serious  injury.  The  season  of  severe 
storms  was  approaching,  when  naval  operations  against 
Fisher  would  become  impracticable.  The  country  was 
distressed.  But  the  obstacles  preventing  immediate  mili- 
tary movement  could  not  be  overcome. 

As  General  Butler  then  commanded  the  Army  of  the 
James,  Beaufort  and  Fisher  were  within  the  geographical 
limits  of  his  department.  He  had,  therefore,  a  technical 
right  to  equip  the  expedition,  and  military  courtesy  re- 
quired that  orders  and  instructions  should  pass  through 
him.  It  would  seem,  however,  that  Grant  did  not  desire 
to  intrust  the  command  to  Butler.  Porter,  in  conversa- 
tion, expressly  told  Grant  he  "  wanted  nothing  to  do  with 
Butler"  (Porter  to  Welles,  January  21,  1865).  Grant 
directed  Butler  to  put  General  Godfrey  Weitzel  in  com- 
mand and  assigned  Butler  to  movements  in  support  of 
Meade  which  he  intended  should  detain  him  in  Bermuda 
Hundred.  But  Weitzel  afterwards  officially  informed 
Grant  that  he  was  never  aware  of  the  instructions  actually 
forwarded  to  Butler  for  him  (Weitzel)  until  he  read 
Butler's  report  of  January  3,  1865,  with  Grant's  official 
papers  accompanying  it.  Butler  signed  all  orders  as 
"  Major-General  commanding." 


EXPEDITIONS  AGAINST  FORT  FISHER,  ETC.       I  55 

November  30,  Grant  learned  that  Bragg  had  gone  to 
Georgia,  taking  most  of  the  forces  from  about  Wilmington. 
Deeming  it  of  the  utmost  importance  the  expedition 
should  reach  its  destination  then,  he  said  to  Butler :  "  It 
is  important  Weitzel  should  get  off  during  his  [Bragg's] 
absence ;  if  successful  in  landing,  he  may  by  a  bold  dash 
capture  Wilmington." 

Meanwhile  Porter  perfected  the  naval  organization.  He 
forged  his  force  into  a  marine  thunderbolt.  He  syste- 
matically disciplined  it  by  drill.  He  divided  the  fleet  into 
three  squadrons,  lithographed  a  plan  of  attack  on  a  large 
scale,  and  assigned  to  each  commander  his  position  in 
action. 

Butler's  course  was  culpable.  He  disobeyed  orders. 
He  provided  inferior  transports  and  inadequate  rations. 
He  took  no  intrenching  tools  or  siege  guns.  He  chose  as 
his  rendezvous  an  offing  in  sight  of  the  Confederates. 
Porter  repeatedly  attempted  to  obtain  some  statement  of 
his  intention,  but  without  success  ;  and  Weitzel  did  not 
seem  to  know  whether  he  (Weitzel)  was  commander  or 
orderly.  Fleet-Captain  Breese  one  day  asked  what  were 
Butler's  plans,  and  Weitzel  replied  he  did  not  believe  Butler 
had  any.     The  general  impression  was  similar. 

Late  in  November,  Butler  communicated  to  Porter  a 
plan  for  destroying  Fort  Fisher.  From  the  effect  of 
explosions  at  Erith  and  Woolwich,  England,  he  had  reason 
to  believe  the  proper  ignition  of  two  hundred  and  fifteen 
tons  of  powder  near  the  walls  of  the  fort  would  dismount 
guns,  explode  magazines,  and  destroy  the  garrison. 
Scientists  sanctioned  the  idea ;  and  Porter,  despite  sub- 
sequent statements  to  the  contrary,  must  have  had  confi- 
dence in  the  scheme,  for  he  "  believed  the  explosion  would 
destroy  Wilmington,"  and  hailed  the  proposal  with  delight 
as  an  expedient  promising  to  end  the  delay.  Butler 
declared  that  if  his  proposition  was  consummated  he 
would  detail  and  embark  troops  as  soon  as  possible. 


I56         MILITARY  ESSAYS  AND   RECOLLECTIONS. 

December  6,  Grant  gave  Butler  these  instructions:  — 

"  The  first  object  of  the  expedition  under  General  Weitzel  is 
to  close  to  the  enemy  the  port  of  Wilmington.  If  successful 
in  this,  the  second  will  be  to  capture  Wilmington  itself.  There 
are  reasonable  grounds  to  hope  for  success,  if  advantage  can 
be  taken  of  the  absence  of  the  greater  part  of  the  enemy's 
forces,  now  looking  after  Sherman  in  Georgia.  The  directions 
you  have  given  for  numbers  and  equipment  are  all  right, 
except  in  the  unimportant  matter  of  where  they  embark  and 
the  amount  of  intrenching  tools  to  be  taken.  The  object  will 
be  gained  by  effecting  a  landing  on  the  mainland,  between 
Cape  Fear  River  and  the  Atlantic,  north  of  the  North  Entrance. 
Should  such  landing  be  effected  while  the  enemy  holds  Fisher 
and  the  batteries  guarding  the  entrance,  the  troops  should 
intrench,  and,  by  co-operating  with  the  navy,  effect  the  reduc- 
tion and  capture  of  those  places.  These  in  our  hands,  the 
navy  could  enter  the  harbor,  and  Wilmington  would  be  sealed. 
Should  Fisher  and  the  Point  fall  into  the  hands  of  our  troops 
immediately  on  landing,  it  will  be  worth  the  attempt  to  capture 
Wilmington  by  forced  march  and  surprise.  If  time  is  consumed 
in  gaining  the  first  object,  the  second  will  become  a  matter  of 
after  consideration.  The  details  for  execution  are  intrusted 
to  you  and  the  officer  immediately  in  command.  Should  the 
troops  under  General  Weitzel  fail  to  effect  a  landing,  they  will 
without  delay  be  returned  to  the  armies  operating  against 
Richmond. 

"  U.  S.  Grant,  Lieutenant- General" 

"  Major  General  B.  F.  Butler." 

Grant  adds :  "  The  importance  of  getting  the  expedi- 
tion off,  with  or  without  the  powder-boat,  without  delay, 
had  been  urged  upon  Butler.  ...  I  directed  him  to  make 
all  arrangements  for  the  departure  of  Major-General 
Weitzel,  —  designated  to  command  the  land  forces,  —  so 
that  the  navy  might  not  be  detained  one  moment."  Yet 
Butler  now  consumed  several  days  in  preparing  his 
powder-boat. 

On    December    12,    Butler    informed    Grant  he   was 


I58         MILITARY  ESSAYS  AND  RECOLLECTIONS. 

going  with  the  expedition.  Grant  had  had  no  idea  of  this, 
and  did  not  dream  but  that  Weitzel  had  received  all 
instructions  and  would  command.  Nevertheless,  he  did 
not  forbid  Butler,  for  he  supposed  he  wished  to  see  the 
explosion  of  his  powder-boat  and  its  effects.  Butler,  on 
December  13,  sent  his  transports  up  the  Potomac  on  a 
useless  parade,  and  squandered  three  days  of  fine  weather, 
during  which  the  enemy  was  without  a  force  to  protect 
himself.  From  Confederate  sources  it  is  known  that  this 
delay  enabled  the  Rebels  to  reinforce.  Had  Butler  landed 
during  the  pleasant  weather  that  prevailed  up  to  the  18th, 
"  he  might,"  according  to  General  Whiting,  "  with  any 
kind  of  energy  and  pluck,  have  succeeded." 

December  19  brought  a  heavy  gale  which  detained  the 
transports  at  Beaufort  until  the  24th.  At  one  time  it  was 
feared  that  the  naval  fleet  would  be  obliged  to  leave  the 
coast,  but  it  rode  out  the  gale  in  a  manner  that  reflects 
great  credit  on  the  navy. 

Although  the  Departments  of  the  Navy  and  of  War 
had  determined  that  a  combined  attack  was  necessary, 
Porter  took  advantage  of  the  ensuing  favorable  weather 
and  arranged  some  independent  movements.  But  he 
again  wrote  to  Butler  that  the  explosion  would  now  occur 
December  23.  As  the  army  was  sixty  miles  away,  the 
decision  was  injudicious,  for  the  success  of  the  enterprise 
demanded  the  speedy  arrival  of  the  land  forces,  to  take 
advantage  of  any  damage  inflicted  by  the  fleet.  That 
night  the  "  Wilderness "  towed  the  "  Louisiana,"  the 
powder-boat,  as  near  the  beach  as  possible,  and  the  fleet 
stood  twenty-five  miles  out  to  sea.  At  1.40  a.  m.,  Decem- 
ber 24,  the  powder  was  exploded.  There  was  absolutely 
no  result.  The  ships  scarcely  felt  the  shock,  and  the 
Confederates  only  thought  a  blockade-runner,  loaded  with 
ammunition,  had  exploded,  or  a  Federal  cruiser  had  burst 
her  boiler. 

At  daylight  the  fleet  stood  in,  and  at  11.30  a.  m.  Porter 
made    signal    to    engage.     His   fifty-six   ships,   carrying 


EXPEDITIONS  AGAINST  FORT  FISHER,  ETC.        I  59 

six  hundred  guns,  took  position  with  almost  perfect  sea- 
manship. There  were  three  divisions :  the  first  was 
opposite  Mound  Battery,  but  three-quarters  of  a  mile  out ; 
the  second  and  third  lay  one  mile  off  the  Northeast 
Bastion,  the  third  slightly  separated  toward  the  north. 
Then  began  what  General  Whiting  pronounced  the 
most  tremendous  bombardment  of  any  war.  Commodore 
Ammen,  a  veteran,  declared  that  it  had  not  been  his  lot 
"  to  witness  any  operations  comparable  in  force  or  effect 
to  this."  By  the  time  all  the  large  vessels  got  in  play, 
Fisher  ceased  to  respond  energetically.  The  firing  of  the 
monitors  was  excellent.  The  shower  of  shell,  one  hun- 
dred and  fifteen  per  minute,  drove  the  garrison  into 
their  bomb-proofs.  The  flag-staff  was  twice  cut  away; 
two  magazines  blew  up ;  and  in  the  burning  of  some 
barracks,  which  continued  for  hours,  the  garrison  lost 
blankets  and  overcoats. 

It  does  not  appear  by  what  authority  Porter  made  this 
purely  naval  attack  of  December  24 ;  but  it  demonstrated 
the  weakness  of  Fisher,  while  bombarded,  to  repel  land 
assailants.  It  was  the  universal  impression  of  the  navy 
that  the  right  general  and  the  right  troops  could  take  it. 
In  a  military  sense,  the  work  might  be  but  little  injured; 
but  the  fleet  was  able  to  keep  the  enemy  from  their  guns 
and  in  their  casemates,  to  win  for  the  soldiery  safe  access 
to  the  foot  of  the  parapet,  to  prevent  attack  from  the  north, 
and  thus  to  double  the  likelihood  of  successful  assault. 

December  25,  at  6.30  a.  m.,  all  the  troop-ships  having 
arrived,  Butler  sent  Weitzel  to  Porter  to  arrange  a  pro- 
gramme, and  urged  the  Admiral  to  run  into  Cape  Fear 
River.  Porter  did  not  accede  to  this  suggestion,  and  his 
failure  to  make  the  attempt  has  been  severely  criticised. 
He  had  performed  feats  that  to  his  critics  seemed  more 
difficult  and  dangerous,  at  Forts  Jackson  and  St.  Philip, 
and  at  New  Orleans.  He  had  with  his  fleet  captured 
blockade-runners  which  had  crossed  this  very  bar.  Gen- 
eral Whiting  affirmed  that  "  a  determined  enemy  could 


l6o         MILITARY  ESSAYS  AND   RECOLLECTIONS. 

make  the  passage."  Porter,  however,  sent  Commander 
Guest  and  Lieutenant  Cushing  to  see  if  an  entrance  could 
be  effected,  and,  upon  their  report,  decided  that  it  was 
not  practicable.  There  would  seem  to  be  but  little 
ground  for  the  criticisms  of  his  conduct. 

At  7  a.  m.,  the  fleet  took  position,  and  fired  for  seven 
hours,  while  the  troops  were  landing  three  miles  north. 

At  12.40,  Commander  Howell  shelled  Flag-Pond  Bat- 
tery (three  miles  north  of  Fort  Fisher),  which  made  no 
response,  and  surrendered  about  2  p.  m.  to  another  gun- 
boat's officer.  The  woods  had  been  raked  by  the  covering 
squadron,  and  General  Adelbert  Ames  landed  twenty- 
three  hundred  men,  —  the  whole  of  Curtis's  brigade  and 
part  of  Pennypacker's,  —  without  the  slightest  hostile 
demonstration  occurring  during  daylight.  The  troops 
formed  a  line  across  the  peninsula ;  Curtis  threw  skir- 
mishers westward,  and  pushed  his  column  of  twelve  hun- 
dred toward  the  fort,  eighty  men  going  within  fifty  yards 
of  it.  One  of  them  —  Captain  Walling,  of  the  One  Hun- 
dred and  Forty-Second  New  York  —  did  what  two  or  three 
could  not  have  done  unobserved.  Hidden  by  the  angle 
at  the  left,  he  crept  through  a  breach  in  the  stockade 
and  captured  a  fallen  pennon.  Ten  soldiers  were  wounded 
by  the  bursting  of  a  naval  shell.  As  the  skirmishers 
approached,  Lamb  withheld  his  fire  till  attack  should  be 
made  in  force,  when  he  intended  to  explode  the  mines, 
and  deliver  a  fire  of  grape  and  canister  which  he  thinks 
no  troops  could  survive.  Unaware  of  these  facts,  how- 
ever, the  gallant  Curtis  reported  to  Ames  that  he  could 
take  the  fort.  Ames  gave  permission,  and  strained  every 
nerve  to  forward  Pennypacker's  brigade  ;  but  the  lateness 
of  its  landing,  —  3  p.  m.,  —  and  the  impracticability  of  a 
three-mile  "double-quick  "  through  deep  sand,  prevented 
such  reinforcement.  Curtis  alone  had  any  brigade  within 
charging  distance  of  Fisher.  He  did  not  take  the  re- 
sponsibility of  assault,  for  no  northward  intrenchments 
prevented  attack  from  Wilmington. 


EXPEDITIONS  AGAINST  FORT  FISHER,  ETC.       l6l 

Colonel  Ames  had  gone  northward  and  captured  Half- 
Moon  Battery  with  two  hundred  and  twenty-five  soldiers. 
Both  these  and  the  Flag-Pond  garrison  were  the  North 
Carolina  Junior  Reserves,  —  mere  boys.  From  the  com- 
mander at  Half-Moon,  Butler  learned  that  Whiting  and 
Bragg  had  begun  calling  for  reinforcements  ;  that  Gov- 
ernor Vance  was  summoning  every  man  who  could  stand 
behind  parapets  and  fire  muskets  to  join  them  ;  that 
Hoke's  division,  six  thousand  strong,  had  been  sent  from 
Richmond,  December  22  ;  and  that  Kirkland's  and  Hay- 
good's  brigades,  numbering  sixteen  hundred  in  all,  had 
arrived  at  Wilmington  the  previous  night  (December  24). 
Weitzel  and  Comstock  were,  with  glasses,  examining 
Fisher's  land  front,  a  half  mile  beyond  them.  They 
found  it  in  perfect  order,  with  only  two  guns  dismounted, 
the  other  seventeen  covering  the  only  practicable  ap- 
proach,—  a  strip  not  wide  enough  for  more  than  one 
thousand  men  in  line.  The  garrison,  though  but  six  hun- 
dred and  seventy-seven  men,  was  active.  Confederate 
forces  were  assembling  at  Sugar  Loaf.  From  the  contour 
of  the  land  and  the  remoteness  of  the  river  channel  from 
the  naval  fire,  it  was  evident  the  Confederates  would  have 
no  difficulty  in  reinforcing  or  provisioning.  The  pali- 
sade, scarcely  injured,  was  alone  a  formidable  obstacle. 
Weitzel,  in  spite  of  personal  considerations  that  would 
naturally  influence  him  in  favor  of  instant  assault,  —  his 
professorship  for  three  years  at  West  Point,  his  experience 
in  assailing,  and  his  desire  to  have  his  recent  appoint- 
ment as  Major-General  confirmed, — announced  that  "to 
attack  with  their  force  would  be  murder."  Comstock 
said :  "  From  the  information  I  had,  I  should  have  agreed 
with  Weitzel,  independent  of  what  Curtis  said  to  me." 
If  Curtis  got  in,  he  would  have  had  to  fight,  and,  unsup- 
ported, would  have  lost  most  of  his  brigade. 

Butler  convinced  himself  that  the  only  alternative  was 
withdrawal.  At  4  p.  m.,  he  said  to  Captain  Alden,  of  the 
"  Brooklyn,"  "  It  has  become  necessary  to  re-embark  ;  will 


I  62        MILITARY  ESSAYS  AND  RECOLLECTIONS. 

you  send  your  boats  to  assist  ? "  Alden  was  surprised, 
for  everything  appeared  propitious.  The  bombardment 
was  at  its  height.  Little  or  no  surf  was  breaking  on  the 
beach.  Nothing  indicated  bad  weather.  He  was  told 
that  the  troops  showed  much  dissatisfaction  when  in- 
formed of  Butler's  decision.  It  was  with  difficulty  they 
could  be  got  into  the  boats.  They  were  loud  in  their 
denunciations,  saying  they  had  gone  there  to  take  the 
fort,  and  they  were  going  to  do  it.  Re-embarkation 
began  at  5  p.  m.,  and  continued  till  midnight,  when  the 
surf  interfered  seriously,  and  seven  hundred  of  Curtis's 
men,  with  only  one  day's  rations,  were  left  ashore.  As 
soon  as  the  greater  part  of  the  troops  were  afloat,  they 
made  for  Hampton  Roads,  arriving  December  28.  The 
abandoned  remainder,  covered  by  gunboats,  stayed  two 
days,  without  the  enemy  molesting  them. 

Admiral  Porter  endeavored  to  dissuade  Butler  from 
abandoning  the  attempt  to  assault  the  fort.  He  repre- 
sented that  he  had  sent  his  largest  vessels  to  Beaufort 
for  ammunition,  and  that  he  could  by  rapid  firing  keep 
the  enemy  from  showing  themselves  until  our  troops  were 
within  twenty  yards  of  the  works.  But  Butler  and  Weit- 
zel  remained  unchangeable;  and  after  the  wind  which 
had  arisen  subsided,  Porter  took  off  the  seven  hundred 
men  of  Curtis's  brigade  and  sailed  for  Beaufort.  He 
immediately  sent  by  a  swift  steamer  a  request  to  send 
"  other  troops  and  another  general." 

Grant  was  greatly  disappointed  and  incensed  at  Butler's 
failure.  He  telegraphed  to  the  President,  December  28, 
indicating  in  the  strongest  terms  his  dissatisfaction.  He 
interviewed  some  of  Butler's  subordinates,  —  General 
Curtis,  Captain  Walling,  and  Lieutenant  Simpson,  of  the 
One  Hundred  and  Forty-Second  New  York,  —  who  ex- 
pressed the  opinion  that  Fisher  could  have  been  taken 
without  much  loss.  Curtis's  view  had  weight  in  deter- 
mining Grant  to  try  again  ;  and,  on  December  30,  he  sent 
a  message  to  Porter  as  follows  :  — 


EXPEDITIONS  AGAINST  FORT  FISHER,  ETC.       I  6 


o 


"  Dear  Admiral,  —  Hold  on  a  few  days,  and  I  will  en- 
deavor to  be  back  with  an  increased  force,  and  without  the 
former  commander." 

The  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  thoroughly 
examined  into  Butler's  conduct  in  refusing  to  make  the 
assault,  and  deliberately  "  concluded  that,  from  all  the 
testimony  before  them,  his  determination  seems  to  have 
been  fully  justified  by  all  the  facts  and  circumstances 
then  known  or  afterwards  ascertained."  It  is  needless  to 
say  that  Butler  appeared  for  himself  in  that  case,  and  that 
he  displayed  greater  skill  in  defence  than  he  had  shown 
himself  to  possess  in  assault.  While  he  was  gravely- 
contending  before  the  committee  at  Washington  that  to 
take  Fisher  by  assault  was  impossible,  the  booming  of 
cannon  announced  to  a  delighted  country  that  Terry  had 
taken  it,  and  by  assault. 

In  selecting  a  commander  for  the  second  expedition, 
General  Grant  was  exceedingly  fortunate.  General  A.  H. 
Terry  was,  as  the  event  proved,  most  admirably  fitted  for 
the  duty.  He  was  an  officer  of  great  clearness  of  per- 
ception, coolness  in  action,  and  undoubted  bravery.  He 
entered  the  service  as  a  volunteer,  and  had  won  an 
honorable  position  by  his  skill  as  a  commander  in  many 
hard-fought  battles.  Admiral  Porter  was  delighted  with 
General  Terry,  and  pronounced  him  "  the  beau-ideal  of  a 
soldier  and  gentleman."  Their  relations  from  the  first 
were  of  the  most  cordial  character,  and  throughout  the 
expedition  their  co-operation  was  perfect.  On  January  2, 
1865,  Terry  was  personally  appointed  by  Grant,  but  with- 
out receiving  the  slightest  information  where  he  was 
going  or  what  he  should  do.  "  He  simply  knew  he  was 
going  to  sea,  and  had  with  him  his  orders,  which  were  to 
be  opened  there.  The  object  and  destination  were  kept 
secret  from  all  except  a  few  in  the  Navy  Department, 
and  the  army,  to  whom  it  was  necessary  to  impart  them." 
He  took  the  same  troops  and  officers  that  Butler  had  had, 
with  the  addition  of  Abbott's  brigade,  numbering  fifteen 


164         MILITARY  ESSAYS  AND   RECOLLECTIONS. 

hundred,  a  small  siege-train,  and  his  personal  staff. 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Comstock,  of  General  Grant's  staff, 
was  appointed  chief  engineer. 

Terry  had  splendid  seconds.  Ames  was  at  the  first 
Bull  Run  as  lieutenant  of  a  battery.  Refusing  to  quit  it, 
he  suffered  severe  wounds,  and  was  removed  on  a  gun- 
caisson.  Afterwards  colonel  of  the  Twentieth  Maine, 
his  services  at  Gettysburg  in  command  of  a  brigade  made 
him  a  brigadier.  At  Cold  Harbor,  Petersburg,  and  Rich- 
mond, he  commanded  a  division.  Curtis,  six  feet  four 
inches  in  height,  was  formed  in  antique  mould.  Sanguine 
of  mood,  he  always  asserted  that  "  assault  would  carry 
Fisher."  He  was  always  ready  to  fight,  always  seeking, 
and  usually  obtaining,  the  foremost  place.  Pennypacker 
was  adored  by  his  men.  Six  times  badly  wounded,  dis- 
tinguished in  many  battles,  he  had  in  three  years  risen 
from  the  rank  of  captain  to  that  of  brigadier.  Bell, 
a  giant,  came  from  old  New  Hampshire  stock  with 
hereditary  ability.  He  had  seen  steady  service  and  hard 
fighting.  Paine  had  especially  distinguished  himself  at 
Newmarket  Heights,  September  29,  1864,  where  his 
troops  had  shown  good  fighting  qualities.  Abbott's  bri- 
gade was  really  Hawley's,  he  being  detained  in  command 
of  the  First  Division  before  Richmond. 

Terry's  instructions  did  not  differ  materially  from 
Butler's.  Grant  added,  however,  that  it  was  exceedingly 
desirable  the  most  complete  understanding  should  exist 
between  him  and  Porter.  Grant  said  he  had  served  with 
Porter,  and  knew  Terry  could  rely  on  his  judgment  and 
nerve  to  undertake  what  he  proposed.  He  would,  there- 
fore, defer  as  much  as  was  consistent  with  Terry's  own 
responsibilities.  Terry  needed  to  look  to  the  practica- 
bility of  receiving  supplies,  and  to  defence  against  supe- 
rior forces.  Grant's  own  views  still  were,  that  the  navy 
ought  to  run  some  ships  into  Cape  Fear  River,  while  the 
remainder  operated  outside.  While  the  river  was  in  Con- 
federate hands,  land  forces  could  not  invest  Fort  Fisher, 


EXPEDITIONS  AGAINST  FORT  FISHER,  ETC.       I  65 

or  cut  off  supplies  and  reinforcements.  But  he  ordered 
neither  Terry  nor  Butler  to  assault,  leaving  that  entirely 
to  their  discretion. 

The  navy  was  doggedly  determined  to  take  Fort 
Fisher,  even  if  it  had  to  do  it  alone.  Though  gale  after 
gale  swept  the  coast,  the  fleet  off  Beaufort  rode  out  all, 
till  Farragut  said :  "  Porter  will  lose  that  fleet ;  he  is  rash 
to  undertake  operations  when  the  elements  are  so 
opposed."  This  was  fighting  the  elements  as  man  never 
fought  them  before.  The  officers  had  been  taught  that 
ours  is  the  worst  coast  in  the  world,  and  that  a  vessel 
could  not  stay  there  at  anchor  through  storms.  It  was  a 
new  school  of  practice,  and  benefited  them.  (In  one 
week,  Porter  coaled  and  ammunitioned  his  fleet  of 
seventy  sail !) 

Terry  arrived  at  Fort  Monroe  the  night  of  January  5, 
and  at  once  sent  out  sailing  orders.  Next  morning,  the 
expedition  sailed,  but  violent  winds  delayed  its  arrival  off 
Beaufort  till  the  8th.  Here  were  Porter  and  part  of  the 
North  Atlantic  squadron.  Foul  weather  detained  all  till 
the  1 2th.  Though  Beaufort  was  inside  the  Federal  lines, 
spies  escaped,  and  from  the  nearest  telegraph  station  sent 
warning.  January  11,  at  noon,  Terry  ordered  departure; 
but  delivering  this  order  occupied  all  the  afternoon. 
Next  day,  eleven  hours'  sailing  took  them  to  340  10',  and 
they  drew  to  land.  The  waves,  however,  swept  the 
shores  so  heavily,  and  night  was  so  near,  that  Porter 
postponed  disembarkment.  At  daybreak,  January  13, 
preparations  were  begun  for  landing  at  a  branch  of 
Masonboro  Inlet,  i.  e.,  Myrtle  Sound,  five  miles  north  of 
Fort  Fisher.  Before  a  single  boat  left  the  transports,  at 
8  a.  m.,  sixteen  gunboats  anchored  inside,  one  hun- 
dred yards  from  the  beach.  The  Confederate  General 
Hoke  had  intended  to  resist  the  disembarkment,  but  the 
naval  fire  strewed  the  woods  with  shell  till  it  seemed  a 
deserted  wilderness.  By  3  p.  M.,  all  the  infantry  had 
disembarked,  treating  the  affair  as  a  mere  picnic  ;  they 


1 66         MILITARY  ESSAYS  AND  RECOLLECTIONS. 

had  forty  rounds  of  ammunition,  six  days'  supply  of  hard- 
tack, and  three  hundred  thousand  rounds  of  ammunition 
for  small-arms. 

The  first  object  to  be  attained  after  landing  was  to 
throw  a  strong  defensive  line  across  the  peninsula  from 
the  sea  to  the  Cape  Fear  River.  General  Terry  finally 
selected  a  position  where  the  maps  showed  a  large  pond 
occupying  about  one-third  of  the  width  of  the  peninsula, 
and  about  three  miles  north  of  the  fort.  The  pond  was 
found  to  be  a  sand-flat,  partly  covered  with  shallow 
water. 

The  division  of  General  Paine,  to  which  the  writer 
belonged,  followed  by  two  of  Ames's  brigades,  made  their 
way  through.  The  night  was  intensely  dark,  and  our 
course  lay  through  morass  and  swamp,  through  water 
waist  deep  in  many  places.  We  reached  dry  and  com- 
paratively open  ground,  and  the  river  beyond,  between 
8.30  and  9  o'clock  in  the  evening.  A  force  of  five  hun- 
dred of  the  enemy  could  have  captured  our  entire  force  in 
detail  as  we  emerged  from  that  swamp  ;  but  no  enemy 
was  found.  In  this  movement  we  passed  through  the 
enemy's  cavalry  picket-line  unobserved.  Later  in  the 
evening,  we  found  ground  to  the  south  better  for  defensive 
purposes,  about  two  miles  from  the  fort,  and  to  this  we 
moved  and  intrenched.  The  morning  of  the  14th  of 
January  found  us  with  a  fairly  strong  breastwork  extend- 
ing from  the  river  to  an  almost  impenetrable  swamp  on 
our  right.  The  writer  was  in  command  of  the  picket-line 
during  the  day,  and,  with  the  exception  of  a  few  shots  in 
the  morning,  we  were  not  disturbed  by  the  enemy  until 
about  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  when  Gen.  Hoke  made 
a  slight  demonstration  in  our  front.  During  the  day, 
Battery  E,  of  the  3d  U.  S.  artillery,  came  ashore,  and  six 
guns  were  placed  in  position  near  the  river. 

The  troops  intended  for  operation  against  the  fort  were 
in  position  between  the  north  line  and  the  fort,  feeling 
their  way  toward  it,  and  waiting  the  final  arrangements 
for  the  assault,  which  were  not  long  delayed. 


EXPEDITIONS  AGAINST  FORT  FISHER,  ETC.        1 67 

General  Terry  and  Colonel  Comstock  made  a  recon- 
noissance  about  eleven  o'clock,  and  found  Curtis  on  the 
river  front.  His  skirmishers  had  captured  Craig's  Wharf, 
nine  hundred  yards  north  of  Fort  Fisher,  together  with  a 
steamer  loaded  with  ammunition  and  meal.  Curtis  now 
pushed  within  five  hundred  yards  of  the  fort,  and  occupied 
a  small  unfinished  outwork.  Terry  and  Comstock  crept 
through  rushes  to  within  three  hundred  yards  of  the  fort, 
unobserved  by  the  enemy,  and  obtained  quite  a  correct 
idea  of  the  fort  at  that  point,  which  was  selected  as  the 
point  of  assault. 

In  deciding  to  assault,  Terry  assumed  a  grave  responsi- 
bility ;  for  during  the  war  no  fort  of  comparable  strength 
had  yielded  to  assault. 

Porter  had  begun  naval  operations  at  7.30  a.  m.  The 
disposition  of  his  fleet  was  different  from  what  it  had  been 
before,  the  vessels  being  much  closer.  Four  ironclads  a 
half-mile  out  pounded  the  Northeast  Bastion.  Behind 
them,  two-thirds  to  three-quarters  of  a  mile  out,  fourteen 
war-ships  formed  line  Number  One,  the  most  northern 
group,  and  concentrated  on  the  land  face.  Southward, 
one  mile  out,  line  Number  Two,  with  twelve  ships,  devoted 
itself  to  the  sea  front.  To  the  same  batteries,  line  Number 
Three,  with  fourteen  vessels,  one  and  a  quarter  miles  out, 
paid  assiduous  attention.  In  the  rear  were  reserves.  The 
fire  was  rapid  and  severe,  continuing  unremittingly  from  4 
p.  m.  till  after  dark.  During  the  night  the  "  New  Iron- 
sides "  and  the  monitors  alone  continued  the  fire. 

During  the  evening  General  Terry  went  to  Admiral 
Porter's  flag-ship,  when,  in  an  interview  lasting  until  late 
at  night,  the  plans  of  attack  were  agreed  upon.  On  the 
next  morning  the  navy  was  to  begin  early  and  fire  rapidly 
until  3  p.  m.  It  was  Porter's  determination  that  before 
that  hour  the  guns  of  Fort  Fisher  should  be  silenced. 

The  general  plan  of  the  assault  prepared  by  General 
Terry  was  that  the  army  should  attack  the  western  half 
of  the  land  face  of  the  fort,  and  that  a  column  of  sailors 


1 68         MILITARY  ESSAYS  AND  RECOLLECTIONS. 

and  marines  should  assault  at  the  Northeast  Bastion.  At 
eight  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  15th,  all  the  vessels, 
except  a  division  left  to  aid  in  the  defence  of  our  northern 
line,  should  it  be  attacked,  moved  into  position,  and,  to 
use  General  Terry's  expression,  a  fire  magnificent  alike 
for  its  power  and  accuracy  was  opened.  General  Ames's 
division  had  been  selected  for  the  assault.  As  before 
indicated,  General  Paine  was  placed  in  command  of  the 
defensive  line,  having  with  him  Abbott's  brigade  in  addi- 
tion to  his  own  division.  Ames's  First  Brigade,  com- 
manded by  Curtis,  was  already  at  the  outwork  above 
mentioned,  and  in  the  trenches  close  around  it.  The 
other  two  brigades,  Pennypacker's  and  Bell's,  were  moved 
to  within  supporting  distance  of  him.  The  preparations 
for  the  assault  were  begun  at  two  o'clock  in  the  after- 
noon. Sixty  sharpshooters  from  the  Thirteenth  Indiana 
Volunteers,  armed  with  the  Spencer  repeating-carbine, 
and  forty  others,  volunteers  from  Curtis's  brigade,  the 
whole  under  command  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Zent,  of  the 
Thirteenth  Indiana,  were  thrown  forward  at  a  run  to 
within  one  hundred  and  fifty  yards  of  the  work.  They 
were  provided  with  shovels,  and  soon  dug  pits  for  shelter, 
and  began  firing  at  the  parapet.  As  soon  as  the  firing 
opened,  the  parapet  of  the  fort  was  manned,  and  the 
enemy's  fire,  both  musketry  and  artillery,  began.  When 
the  sharpshooters  reached  their  position,  Curtis's  brigade 
moved  forward  at  double-quick  into  line,  about  four  hun- 
dred and  seventy-five  yards  from  the  work,  and  there  lay 
down.  This  was  accomplished  under  a  sharp  fire  from 
the  enemy,  from  which,  however,  the  men  soon  sheltered 
themselves  by  digging  shallow  trenches,  each  man  con- 
structing his  own  earthwork.  Pennypacker's  brigade 
took  the  place  of  Curtis's  in  the  outwork,  and  Bell's  was 
brought  into  line  two  hundred  yards  in  his  rear.  Curtis 
again  moved  forward,  on  the  reverse  slope  of  a  crest 
fifty  yards  in  the  rear  of  the  sharpshooters,  and  again 
intrenched  ;    Pennypacker   following   and   occupying  the 


EXPEDITIONS  AGAINST  FORT  FISHER,  ETC.       1 69 

ground  vacated  by  Curtis,  bringing  Bell's  brigade  to  the 
outwork.  It  was  found  that  the  fire  of  the  navy  had 
been  so  effective  during  the  preceding  night  and  morning 
that  many  openings  had  been  made  in  the  palisade, 
which,  with  the  aid  of  a  few  axe-men,  were  soon  made 
large  enough  for  our  men  to  pass  through.  At  3.25  p.  m., 
preparations  being  completed,  the  order  to  move  forward 
was  given  to  Ames,  and  Terry  signalled  Admiral  Porter 
to  change  the  direction  of  his  fire.  Curtis's  brigade 
sprang  from  the  trenches  and  dashed  forward  in  line.  Its 
left  was  exposed  to  a  severe  enfilading  fire,  and  it  obliqued 
to  the  right,  so  as  to  envelop  the  left  of  the  land  front. 
The  ground  over  which  it  moved  was  difficult  to  cover, 
being  marshy  ;  but  it  soon  reached  the  palisades,  passed 
through  them,  and  effected  a  lodgment  on  the  parapet. 
At  the  same  time  the  column  of  sailors  and  marines, 
under  Fleet-Captain  Breese,  advanced  up  the  beach  in 
the  most  gallant  manner,  and  attacked  the  Northeast 
Bastion.  Their  great  force  gave  the  Confederates  the 
impression  that  this  was  the  main  attack,  and  they  made 
their  dispositions  accordingly.  Colonel  Lamb,  command- 
ing the  fort,  was  at  that  bastion,  and  personally  directed 
operations  there.  This  column  was  exposed  to  a  murder- 
ous fire,  and  was  unable  to  get  up  the  parapet.  After  a 
severe  struggle,  with  large  losses  of  valuable  officers  and 
men,  they  were  withdrawn,  and  retired  up  the  beach,  leav- 
ing about  one  hundred  and  sixty  killed  and  wounded. 

Lieutenant-Commander  Harris,  of  this  commandery, 
who  was  with  the  navy  during  both  of  these  expeditions, 
and  who  participated  in  this  assault,  has,  at  my  request, 
given  some  of  his  personal  recollections  of  these  days  in 
a  letter  to  me,  which  I  will  here  read :  — 

Chicago,  Thursday,  February  13,  1890. 
Major  E.  J.  Harkness  : 

My  dear  Major,  —  As  you  requested  me  last  night,  I  have 

been  trying  to  think  this  morning  of  Fort  Fisher,  and  to  recall 

enough  of  the  naval  side  of  the  story  to  supply  your  want.     If 

vol.  11.  —  II 


170        MILITARY  ESSAYS  AND  RECOLLECTIONS. 

your  business  had  allowed  us  to  go  over  your  notes  together,  1 
might  have  been  of  more  assistance.  My  recollection  of  the 
events  is  vivid  enough,  but  what  I  recall  is  so  largely  personal 
history  that  it  is  fit  only  to  tell  my  children.  These  are  the 
general  facts  which  I  think   you  want : — 

In  regard  to  the  powder-boat :  Like  more  than  half  the  offi- 
cers of  the  squadron,  I  volunteered  for  duty  in  it,  and  up  to 
the  last  moment  hoped  to  be  detailed  for  a  special  post  in  her. 
Who  is  to  blame  for  the  failure  I  cannot  say.  The  reason  she 
failed  so  completely  was  because  the  powder  was  not  confined 
as  it  should  have  been,  and  because  the  boat  did  not  take  the 
ground.  The  destruction  of  the  Duke  of  Alva's  bridge,  below 
Antwerp,  by  the  first  powder-boat,  might  have  taught  whoever 
did  plan  the  attempt  the  necessity  of  those  two  conditions. 
The  first  explosion  threw  the  most  of  the  powder  out  of  the 
hull,  and  it  then  exploded  on  the  surface  of  the  water.  About 
the  first  expedition  :  No  one  can  reconcile  the  stories  of  Gen- 
eral Butler  and  Admiral  Porter.  I  know  that  the  entire  fleet, 
men  and  officers,  believed  that  it  was  jealousy  only  which  pre- 
vented the  entry  of  the  army.  We  expected  to  see  it  march  in 
and  take  possession  without  resistance.  As  you  know,  there 
was  no  flag  flying  when  the  landing  was  made  ;  and  so  far  as 
we  could  see,  the  men  in  the  Flag-Pond  and  Half-Moon  batteries 
were  quite  willing  to  surrender.  We  could  see  from  our  decks 
small  bodies  of  soldiers  walking  about  the  fort,  close  to  it,  and 
unmolested.  I  cannot  vouch  for  more  than  I  saw  ;  but  as  Gen- 
eral Butler  said  himself  that  an  officer  carried  off  the  flag,  which 
had  been  shot  down,  and  no  one  interfered  with  him,  and  as 
the  reports  of  all  the  division  commanders  agree,  I  must  believe 
that  the  re-embarkation  was  wrong.  Men  like  Commodores 
Schenk  and  Redford  do  not  state  what  they  are  not  sure  of. 
It  certainly  is  strange  that  the  seven  hundred  men,  deserted 
on  the  beach,  remained  there  two  days  unmolested,  when  the 
weather  was  so  bad  that  we  could  not  bring  them  off  to  the 
ships.  I  do  not  doubt  that  if  Admiral  Porter  could  have 
known  of  the  General's  intentions,  he  would  have  landed  us, 
and  might  have  taken  the  fort. 

The  feeling  of  the  navy  against  General  Butler  was  bitter, 
and  seemed  to  be  shared  by  some  of  the  army.    On  the  second 


EXPEDITIONS  AGAINST  FORT  FISHER,  ETC.        I  J  I 

expedition  I  landed  four  or  five  boat-loads  of  a  colored  regi- 
ment, including  the  field  officers.  The  smell  of  the  men  was 
a  trifle  "loud,"  and,  making  inquiry,  I  was  told  that  they  had 
been  three  weeks  without  their  knapsacks,  which  had  been  left 
behind  in  camp  by  General  Butler's  order.  I  asked  one  of  the 
officers  why,  and  was  answered  that  the  General  was  spiteful 
because  Grant  would  not  let  him  command  this  (second)  expe- 
dition. They  certainly  had  no  knapsacks,  and  the  language  of 
the  officers  was  as  strong  as  the  smell  of  the  men. 

The  gale  which  the  fleet  rode  out,  off  Beaufort,  was  an 
incident  which  would  not  be  appreciated  by  your  audience 
to-night. 

Of  the  second  bombardment  and  landing,  you  know  all  that 
I  can  tell  you. 

Of  the  movement  of  the  army  after  landing,  I  know  nothing, 
except  what  I  have  read  and  heard. 

Like  the  Rebel  army  in  the  fort,  the  officers  (except  the 
leading  ones)  and  the  men  of  the  fleet  supposed  that  General 
Terry  had  gone  up  the  peninsula  to  meet  General  Hoke ;  and 
when,  on  the  morning  of  January  15,  sixteen  hundred  of  us 
landed,  we  saw  no  sign  of  soldiers,  and  supposed  that  we  were 
to  assault  the  fort  without  any  support.  After  we  were  landed, 
we  were  organized  into  three  regiments.  The  men  from  each 
ship  formed  a  company.  The  senior  officer  from  our  ship 
(Lieutenant  Bache)  became  major  of  the  centre  regiment, 
leaving  me  in  command  of  the  "  Powhatan's  "  men,  with  Ensign 
(now  Commander)  Evans  as  lieutenant.  We  were  the  right- 
centre  company  of  the  centre  regiment.  We  were  drilled  a 
little  after  forming,  and  then  lay  down  in  a  long  line  on  the 
beach,  while  for  several  hours  the  fleet  fired  over  us  into  the 
fort.  This  was  a  very  trying  ordeal.  The  shells  from  fifty- 
eight  men-of-war  made  a  horrible  screeching,  and  one  eleven- 
inch  gun  (said  to  be  the  after  pivot-gun  of  the  "  Vanderbilt  ") 
fired  several  shells  into  our  column.  The  wounded  had  to  be 
carried  through  our  ranks,  and  it  seemed  to  discourage  the  men 
somewhat.  It  was  about  three  o'clock  when  the  fleet  suddenly 
ceased  its  fire,  and  we  rose  to  our  feet  and  formed  a  line  across 
the  field.  It  was  intended  that  the  marines  should  occupy 
some  rifle-pits   (thrown  up   by  the   sailors  under  Lieutenant 


172         MILITARY  ESSAYS  AND   RECOLLECTIONS. 

Preston),  about  six  hundred  rods  from  the  fort.  They  were 
about  four  hundred  strong,  and  armed  with  Springfield  rifles  ; 
while  only  one  company  of  the  blue-jackets  was  armed  with 
anything  except  cutlasses  and  revolvers.  But,  for  some  reason, 
the  marines  were  halted  in  a  line  nearly  out  of  range,  and  the 
sailors  prepared  to  "  board  the  fort  in  a  seaman-like  manner." 
In  the  mean  time  some  field-pieces  opened  on  us,  but  did  n't 
do  much  harm;  and,  after  the  shell-fire  we  had  been  under,  the 
sailors  were  more  amused  than  frightened  by  the  little  balls 
that  came  ricocheting  over  the  sand.  After  the  marines  were 
halted,  our  line  was  faced  to  the  left,  and  Fleet-Captain  Breese 
gave  the  order,  "  Head  of  column,  right,"  which  sent  us  down  the 
beach  in  a  column  of  fours.  The  marines  of  our  ship,  the 
"  Powhatan,"  happened  to  be  on  the  left  of  the  marine  line, 
which  opened  to  let  us  through,  and  they  deserted  their  officer 
(who  had  lately  joined  the  ship),  and  fell  in  with  our  company. 
We  commenced  to  "  double-quick  "  nearly  a  mile  from  the  pali- 
sades, and  many  were  very  faint  from  so  long  a  run  in  the  sand. 
Of  the  heavy  guns  in  the  fort,  all  except  two  were  disabled. 
One  of  these  two  —  an  elegant  one-hundred-and-fifty-pounder, 
with  the  broad-arrow  of  her  Majesty,  and  mounted  on  a  polished 
mahogany  carriage  —  had  been  presented  by  the  City  of  Lon- 
don, and  was  so  placed  that  it  could  hardly  be  reached  by  the 
guns  of  the  ships.  A  discharge  of  grape  from  this  gun  struck 
our  men  just  in  front  of  where  I  was  running.  One  ball  knocked 
my  sword  into  the  water.  Many  men  were  struck  down,  and  the 
unhurt,  falling  over  the  bodies,  left  me  for  an  instant  quite  alone. 
On  reaching  the  palisades,  the  first  regiment  turned  to  the  right, 
and,  running  along  the  line,  got  into  shot-holes.  Our  comman- 
der, with  about  thirty  others,  had  to  remain  in  a  hole,  made  by 
the  explosion  of  a  fifteen-inch  shell,  until  night.  Our  regiment 
broke  through  the  palisade,  and  lay  down  on  the  glacis  of  the 
fort.  The  third  regiment  lay  on  the  beach  as  close  up  as  it 
could  get  to  the  fort.  From  where  I  lay  on  the  glacis,  we  could 
see  the  four  rows  of  soldiers  in  the  fort,  two  ranks  firing,  and  two 
loading,  and  hear  their  taunts  to  "  come  on."  No  sailor  reached 
the  parapet.  Ensign  George  C.  Davis  (now  Commander) 
reached  a  hole  in  the  face  of  the  parapet.  No  one  went  fur- 
ther. At  this  time  there  was  no  distinct  sound  of  the  bullets,  but 
only  a  steady  rush,  and  the  water  close  to  the  beach  was  lashed 


EXPEDITIONS  AGAINST  FORT  FISHER,  ETC.       I  73 

to  foam.  I  would  not  have  supposed  men  could  fire  so  fast. 
We  only  lay  a  few  minutes  under  this  fire  before  the  troops  got 
in  on  your  side,  and  nearly  all  the  enemy  were  withdrawn  to 
meet  you. 

Much  has  been  said  of  W.  B.  Cushing.  I  saw  him  half-way 
back  to  the  rifle-pits.  He  had  seen  his  friend  Porter  shot 
down,  and  had  taken  his  sword.  He  was  crying  and  swear- 
ing at  a  few  men  he  had  gathered  together,  and  who  were  being 
called  away  by  their  wounded  friends  lying  near.  I  spoke  to 
him,  and  at  once  he  controlled  himself  perfectly,  and  told  me 
that  an  orderly  had  come  from  General  Terry,  saying  that  he 
had  seven  traverses,  and  could  take  no  more  unless  the  sailors 
would  make  another  demonstration  against  the  sea-side  of  the 
fort.  If  the  sailors  could  not  be  brought  up  again,  he  said  he 
would  dig  a  ditch  between  the  traverses,  and  hold  what  he  had 
till  morning.  Three  or  four  of  us  stayed  with  Cushing  till  we 
saw  it  was  useless.  The  loss  of  the  navy  was  great.  Admiral 
Porter  reports  twenty-one  officers  and  three  hundred  and  nine 
men  lost  from  twenty-nine  ships.  There  were  twenty-nine  more 
ships ;  and  from  the  "  Wabash "  only  twelve  were  reported 
wounded,  instead  of  about  thirty.  As  the  marines  of  our  ship 
joined  the  blue-jackets,  I  don't  know  how  many  we  had ;  but 
all  but  eighteen  were  hit.  The  reported  loss  was  twenty-nine. 
All  the  officers  were  wounded.  We  went  ashore  in  three  boats, 
and  returned  in  one.  I  say  this  to  show  that  the  probable  loss 
was  over  four  hundred  out  of  the  sixteen  hundred  who  landed. 
After  the  repulse,  the  sailors  who  could,  went  to  the  upper  line 
of  the  intrenchments,  near  Terry's  headquarters  ;  but  I  know 
nothing  of  that. 

Very  sincerely  yours,  Ira  Harris. 

When  Curtis  moved  forward,  Pennypacker  was  directed 
to  .take  position  in  rear  of  the  sharpshooters,  and  Bell  was 
brought  to  Pennypacker's  last  position.  As  soon  as  Curtis 
got  a  foothold  on  the  parapet,  Pennypacker  was  sent  to 
his  support.  He  advanced,  swung  around  Curtis's  right, 
and  drove  the  enemy  from  the  palisades,  which  extended 
from  the  west  end  of  the  land  face  to  the  river,  capturing 
a  considerable  number  of  prisoners. 


174         MILITARY  ESSAYS  AND  RECOLLECTIONS. 

Nothing  could  surpass  the  magnificent  manner  in  which 
Pennypacker  and  his  men  made  this  charge.  They  swept 
the  enemy  westward  and  opened  the  sally-port  from  the 
inside,  and  the  two  brigades  together  drove  the  enemy 
from  about  one-fourth  of  their  land  face.  Ames  brought 
up  Bell's  brigade,  and  moved  it  between  the  fort  and  the 
river.  On  this  side  there  was  no  parapet,  but  an  abund- 
ance of  cover  was  afforded  to  the  enemy  by  cavities  from 
which  sand  had  been  taken  for  traverses,  behind  which 
they  stubbornly  resisted  the  advance  of  Pennypacker  and 
Curtis.  Much  band-to-hand  fighting  of  a  desperate  char- 
acter ensued  upon  these  huge  traverses.  Our  men  would 
make  a  charge  to  the  summit  of  a  traverse,  to  be  met  by 
the  Confederates  coming  from  the  other  side,  where  these 
hand-to-hand  struggles  occurred.  One  or  two  of  these 
traverses  were  retaken,  and  held  for  a  short  time  by  the 
Confederates,  but  they  were  soon  driven  out  for  the  last 
time. 

By  this  time  Terry  had  concluded  that  reinforcements 
were  necessary,  and  sent  an  order  for  Abbott's  brigade 
to  move  down  from  the  north  line,  also  directing  General 
Paine  to  send  one  of  the  strongest  regiments  of  his 
division.  About  dusk  these  troops  arrived,  and  reported 
to  General  Ames.  At  six  o'clock,  Abbott's  brigade  went 
into  the  fort,  and  a  regiment  from  Paine's  division  — 
the  Twenty-Seventh  United  States  Colored  troops,  com- 
manded by  Brevet  Brigadier-General  A.  M.  Blackman  — 
was  brought  up  to  the  rear  of  the  fort,  where  it  remained 
under  fire  for  some  time.  The  fire  of  the  navy  up  to  this 
time  had  been  directed  to  that  portion  of  the  work  not 
occupied  by  us.  After  that  time  it  was  directed  to  the 
beach,  to  prevent  reinforcements  being  sent  from  the 
other  side  of  the  river  to  Battery  Buchanan.  This  hand- 
to-hand  fight  over  these  traverses  continued  till  nine 
o'clock  in  the  evening,  when  two  more  of  them  were 
carried.  Abbott's  brigade  then  drove  the  Confederates 
from  their  last  defences,  and  the  occupation  of  the  work 
was  complete. 


EXPEDITIONS  AGAINST  FORT  FISHER,  ETC.       I  75 

Abbott's  brigade  and  Blackman's  regiment  immedi- 
ately pushed  down  the  point  to  Battery  Buchanan,  whither 
many  of  the  garrison  had  fled,  hoping  to  find  means 
of  escape  across  the  river  to  Smithville.  But  this  work 
had  been  abandoned  early  in  the  evening ;  the  boats  were 
gone,  guns  were  spiked,  and  when  Abbott  and  Blackman 
reached  the  place  no  defence  was  made,  and  all  the 
remaining  garrison  were  made  prisoners.  Major-General 
Whiting  surrendered  his  sword  to  General  Blackman,  and 
Colonel  Lamb  was  also  taken  prisoner.  Both  these 
gallant  officers  were  severely  wounded,  General  Whiting 
dying  of  his  wounds  in  March  following,  in  the  North. 
About  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  General  Hoke  made 
a  demonstration  against  our  north  line,  with  the  apparent 
design  of  attacking  it.  But  if  this  was  his  intention,  he 
abandoned  it  after  a  skirmish  with  our  pickets.  This, 
with  the  slight  skirmish  on  the  morning  of  the  14th,  was 
the  only  demonstration  made  by  Hoke  and  Bragg,  with 
six  thousand  men,  against  our  northern  line.  Captain 
Edgerly,  of  the  Third  New  Hampshire,  brought  General 
Terry  the  flag  of  Fort  Fisher.  Among  other  effects,  fifty 
scraggy  ponies  were  found  at  Battery  Buchanan.  These 
animals  became  intensely  interesting  to  our  wearied  staff 
officers,  and  were  rapidly  secured  and  made  use  of.  In 
the  action,  one  hundred  and  ten  of  our  men  were  killed, 
and  five  hundred  and  thirty-six  wounded,  and  of  the  navy 
about  three  hundred  were  killed  and  wounded  ;  while  the 
Confederates  lost  over  seven  hundred. 

The  next  morning,  as  Bell's  brigade  were  bivouacking 
around  the  main  magazine,  it  exploded  with  a  tremendous 
shock.  A  mountain  of  earth  shot  into  the  air,  rolled  to 
the  right  and  left,  and  fell  back  in  a  mass  twenty  feet 
deep.  About  one  hundred  Federals  and  thirty  Confed- 
erates instantly  suffered  death  and  burial  at  once.  Fort 
Fisher  was  their  monument  and  grave.  It  was  first 
charged  that  the  Confederates  exploded  this  magazine  by 
an  electric  current  from  the  other  side  of  the  river.     But 


176        MILITARY  ESSAYS  AND  RECOLLECTIONS. 

a  board  of  officers,  appointed  to  investigate,  found  that 
it  was  the  result  of  an  accident  attributable  to  our  own 
men. 

It  is  needless  to  say  that  the  rejoicing  in  the  army  and 
navy  at  the  successful  termination  of  this  great  military 
and  naval  enterprise  was  exuberant  and  tumultuous. 
From  ten  o'clock  at  night,  when  the  firing  ceased,  until 
the  morning  dawned,  the  army  echoed  back  the  shouts 
of  the  navy,  while  the  sky  was  filled  with  rockets,  which 
could  be  seen  for  miles  around.  The  combined  efforts 
of  the  army  and  navy  thus  secured  one  of  the  most 
important  successes  of  the  war.  This  was  Grant's  opin- 
ion. And  undoubtedly  the  fall  of  Fort  Fisher  and  the 
closing  of  the  port  of  Wilmington  precipitated  the  col- 
lapse of  the  Confederacy  at  Richmond.  Even  the  British 
Government,  which  had  till  that  time  held  out  hopes  to 
the  Confederacy's  emissaries,  now  sent  word  to  them 
through  Washington,  rebuking  the  Rebels  for  their 
stubbornness. 

If  Porter  had  his  Butler,  Lamb  and  Whiting  had  their 
Bragg.  The  responsibility  for  the  failure  to  hold  Fort 
Fisher  must  rest  with  him.  In  speaking  of  this  disaster 
to  the  Confederate  cause,  General  Whiting,  lying  wounded 
at  Fort  Fisher,  on  January  18,  wrote  to  General  Lee, 
saying :  — 

"  I  think  that  the  result  might  have  been  avoided,  and  Fort 
Fisher  still  held,  if  the  commanding  general  had  done  his  duty. 
I  charge  him  with  this  loss,  —  with  neglect  of  duty  in  this,  that 
he  either  refused  or  neglected  to  carry  out  every  suggestion  made 
to  him  in  official  communications  by  me  for  the  distribution  of 
the  troops,  and  especially  that  he  failed  to  appreciate  the  lesson 
to  be  derived  from  the  previous  attempt  of  Butler.  Instead  of 
keeping  his  troops  in  position  to  attack  the  enemy  on  his 
appearance,  he  moves  them  twenty  miles  from  the  point  of 
landing,  in  spite  of  repeated  warnings.  He  might  have  learned 
that  his  failure  to  interrupt  either  the  landing  or  the  embark- 
ing of  Butler  for  two  days  with  his  troops,  though  disgraceful 


EXPEDITIONS  AGAINST  FORT  FISHER,  ETC.        I  J  J 

enough,  would  indicate  to  the  enemy  that  he  would  have  the 
same  security  for  any  future  expedition.  The  previous  failure 
was  due  to  the  strength  of  Fort  Fisher  alone,  and  not  to  any  of 
the  supporting  troops.  I  charge  him  further  with  making  no 
effort  whatever  to  create  a  diversion  in  favor  of  the  beleaguered 
garrison  during  the  three  days'  battle,  by  attacking  the  enemy, 
though  that  was  to  be  expected,  since  his  delay  and  false  dis- 
positions allowed  the  enemy  to  secure  his  rear  by  works,  but 
works  of  no  strength.  I  desire  that  a  full  investigation  be  had 
of  this  matter,  and  these  charges  which  I  make.  They  will  be 
fully  borne  out  by  the  official  records." 

Colonel  Lamb,  who  was  in  immediate  command  of  the 
force  in  the  fort,  is  even  more  severe  in  his  criticism  of 
Bragg.  General  Bragg,  at  one  o'clock  on  the  16th  of 
January,  telegraphed  to  Richmond  in  these  words  :  "  I 
am  mortified  at  having  to  report  the  unexpected  capture 
of  Fort  Fisher,  with  most  of  its  garrison,  about  ten  o'clock 
the  night  of  the  15th.  Particulars  not  yet  known."  He 
also  made  a  report  of  his  operations  to  President  Davis, 
January,  1865,  in  which  he  endeavors  to  excuse  his  con- 
duct in  not  attacking  our  north  line  and  in  not  reinforcing 
Fort  Fisher  by  the  river,  during  the  night  of  the  14th,  by 
saying  that  his  command  could  not  have  been  divided 
with  safety,  and  that  an  attack  upon  our  intrenchments 
would  have  been  undoubtedly  repulsed  with  great  loss  to 
himself. 

It  is  difficult  to  understand  why  General  Hoke,  with 
his  splendid  record  as  a  fighting  Confederate,  and  with 
the  magnificent  troops  which  he  brought  with  him  from 
Richmond,  should  have  allowed  himself  to  remain  at 
Sugarloaf,  seven  miles  above  Fisher,  without  making  any 
attempt  to  relieve  Whiting  or  to  attack  Paine's  defensive 
line.  General  Hoke  was  a  special  favorite  of  President 
Davis,  and  had  been  selected  by  Davis  and  Lee  for  some 
of  the  most  difficult  and  dangerous  work  connected  with 
the  defence  of  Richmond.  By  direction  of  Davis  and 
Lee,  with  his  command,  he  made  the  celebrated  charge 


178         MILITARY  ESSAYS  AND  RECOLLECTIONS. 

on  Fort  Harrison,  on  the  north  side  of  the  James  River, 
for  the  purpose  of  recapturing  it,  in  November,  1864, — 
one  of  the  most  gallant  charges  ever  made  in  that  or  any 
other  war.  At  Petersburgh,  on  the  15th  of  June,  and  at 
Drury's  Bluff,  he  was  the  most  conspicuous  character  on 
the  Confederate  side.  In  conversing  with  General  Hoke 
about  three  years  since,  I  introduced  this  subject,  and 
was  unable  to  secure  from  him  any  explanation  with 
respect  to  this  Fort  Fisher  affair.  I  gathered,  however, 
from  some  intimations,  that  upon  Bragg  the  whole  respon- 
sibility of  his  supine  policy  should  rest.  There  has  never 
been  any  question  in  my  mind,  either  from  the  reports 
made  of  these  operations,  or  from  my  own  observation, 
that  the  landing  of  our  forces  at  Masonborough  Sound, 
or,  at  any  rate,  the  establishment  of  a  line  across  the 
peninsula  from  ocean  to  river,  could  have  been  pre- 
vented by  a  resolute  and  determined  enemy.  Neither 
has  there  been  any  doubt  that  after  the  line  was  estab- 
lished, an  attack  by  Hoke  upon  the  north  line  would  have 
been  so  serious  a  diversion  as  to  have  withdrawn  a  large 
portion  of  the  assaulting  force  from  Fort  Fisher,  and  ren- 
dered that  assault  impracticable.  But  the  Confederates 
were  everywhere  discouraged  and  dispirited  ;  and  possibly 
to  this  despondency,  as  much  as  anything,  can  be  attrib- 
uted the  course  pursued  by  Bragg  with  relation  to  the 
relief  of  Fort  Fisher. 

No  estimate  of  the  forces  which  brought  about  the 
reduction  of  Fort  Fisher  would  be  correct  which  did  not 
accord  to  the  navy  the  larger  share  of  the  credit.  But 
for  the  fact  that  nearly  every  gun  in  Fort  Fisher  was 
rendered  useless  by  the  fire  of  the  navy,  no  successful 
assault  could  have  been  made  by  the  land  forces.  Secre- 
tary Stanton,  who  was  at  Fort  Fisher  about  a  week  after 
its  capture,  met  Terry  and  Porter  upon  Porter's  flag-ship, 
and,  in  his  report  to  the  President,  speaks  of  the  fact 
that  "  Admiral  Porter  and  General  Terry  vied  in  their 
commendations  each  of  the  other.     Each  seemed  more 


EXPEDITIONS  AGAINST  FORT  FISHER,  ETC.        I  79 

anxious  to  do  justice  to  the  other  than  to  claim  anything 
for  himself,  and  they  united  in  the  highest  commendation 
of  the  naval  and  military  officers  and  the  forces  engaged. 
To  this  harmony  of  feeling  and  the  confident  spirit 
inspired,  may  perhaps  be  attributed  in  some  degree  the 
success  of  an  attack,  with  nearly  equal  numbers,  against 
a  resolute  enemy,  in  a  work  unsurpassed,  if  ever  equalled, 
in  strength,  and  which  General  Beauregard  a  few  days 
before  pronounced  impregnable." 

I  have  neglected  to  mention  that  in  this  assault  Colonel 
Bell,  commanding  the  Third  Brigade  of  General  Ames's 
division,  was  killed  while  gallantly  leading  the  charge  at 
the  west  end  of  the  land  face.  Colonel  Penny  packer  re- 
ceived a  severe  wound,  from  which  for  months  it  was  not 
expected  he  would  recover,  and  which  has  rendered  him  an 
invalid  for  life.  General  Curtis  was  also  severely  wounded, 
his  wound  resulting  in  the  loss  of  the  sight  of  one  of  his 
eyes.  The  losses  in  detail,  with  other  data,  will  be  shown 
by  a  statement  attached  to  this  paper. 

Within  twenty-four  hours  after  the  fall  of  Fort  Fisher, 
the  formidable  chain  of  works  around  the  two  mouths  of 
the  Cape  Fear  River  fell  into  Porter's  hands.  Our  light- 
draft  gunboats  crossed  the  bar,  and  felt  their  way  care- 
fully through  the  channel  of  the  river,  removing  torpedoes, 
with  which  the  river  was  filled  at  that  point.  Lieutenant 
dishing  made  a  reconnoissance  on  January  17,  and  found 
Forts  Caswell  and  Shaw  blown  up,  and  Bald  Head  and 
Campbell  destroyed.  The  fortifications  at  Smithville 
were  also  abandoned.  Three  of  these  forts  had  been 
built  to  keep  out  any  force,  and  were  wonderful  speci- 
mens of  engineering.  They  mounted  eighty-three  guns, 
nine-inch,  ten-inch,  and  one-hundred-and-fifty-pound  Arm- 
strongs, completely  commanding  the  channel  of  the  river, 
and  were  nearly  out  of  the  reach  of  projectiles  from 
seaward. 

January  18,  Colonel  Ames,  commanding  the  Third  Bri- 
gade of  Paine's  division,  reconnoitred  toward  Wilmington, 


l8o         MILITARY  ESSAYS  AND  RECOLLECTIONS. 

and  found  the  Confederates  in  force  at  Sugarloaf.  Hoke 
was  strongly  intrenched  at  Sugarloaf,  and  occupied  Fort 
Anderson,  upon  the  opposite  side  of  the  river,  with  a  col- 
lateral line  running  to  a  large  swamp  three-quarters  of  a 
mile  distant.  It  was  a  strong  position,  and  could  only  be 
taken  by  crossing  the  Sound  above  Hoke's  left,  or  passing 
around  the  swamp  on  his  right.  On  February  n,  Gen- 
eral Terry  pushed  forward  Paine's  division  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Sugarloaf,  and  drove  in  the  Rebel  pickets,  and 
established  a  line  directly  under  and  about  five  hundred 
yards  distant  from  the  Confederate  main  line  on  Sugarloaf 
Hill.  General  Schofield  then  attempted  to  send  a  fleet 
of  navy-boats  and  pontoons  above  the  enemy's  position  ; 
and  a  force,  composed  of  General  Coxe's  and  General 
Ames's  divisions,  was  to  march  along  the  beach  in  the 
night  to  the  point  where  the  boats  were  to  land,  haul 
them  across  the  beach  into  the  Sound,  and  cross  the  Sound 
to  the  mainland  in  rear  of  Hoke's  position.  The  weather 
was  so  stormy  as  to  render  the  execution  of  this  plan 
impossible.  It  was  again  attempted  on  the  night  of 
February  14;  but  the  unusually  high  tide  caused  by  the 
heavy  sea  wind  defeated  the  plan  again.  General  Scho- 
field then  directed  his  attention  to  the  enemy's  right,  and 
sent  General  Coxe  and  General  Ames  over  to  Smithville, 
where  they  advanced  along  the  Wilmington  road  until 
they  encountered  the  enemy's  position  at  Fort  Anderson. 
These  two  brigades  intrenched  to  occupy  the  enemy, 
while  General  Coxe,  with  his  other  two  brigades  and 
General  Ames's  division,  moved  around  the  swamp, 
covering  the  enemy's  right,  to  strike  the  Wilmington  road 
in  the  rear  of  Fort  Anderson.  The  enemy,  warned  by 
his  cavalry  of  General  Coxe's  movement,  abandoned  his 
works  on  both  sides  of  the  river  during  the  night  of 
February  19,  and  fell  back  behind  Town  Creek  on  the 
west  side,  and  to  a  corresponding  position  covered  by 
swamps  on  the  east  side.  Here  was  another  gain  of  ten 
pieces  of  heavy  ordnance,  and  the  possession  of  the  main 


EXPEDITIONS  AGAINST  FORT  FISHER,  ETC.       l8l 

defences  of  Cape  Fear  River  and  Wilmington  by  our 
troops,  with  comparatively  trifling  loss.  General  Coxe, 
on  the  20th,  pursued  the  enemy  to  Town  Creek,  behind 
which  he  was  found  intrenched,  having  destroyed  the 
only  bridge  across  the  creek.  General  Terry  also 
encountered  the  enemy  in  position  on  the  other  side  of 
the  river,  in  forces  superior  to  his.  General  Ames  re- 
crossed  the  river  and  joined  General  Terry  on  the  night 
of  the  19th.  On  the  20th,  General  Coxe  crossed  Town 
Creek  by  the  use  of  a  single  flat-boat  found  in  the 
stream,  and  by  wading  swamps  reached  the  enemy's  flank 
and  rear,  attacked  and  routed  him,  capturing  two  pieces 
of  artillery  and  three  hundred  and  seventy-five  prisoners, 
and  dispersing  the  remainder  of  his  force.  During  the 
night  General  Coxe  rebuilt  the  bridge,  crossed  his  artil- 
lery, and  the  next  morning  pushed  on  toward  Wilming- 
ton without  opposition.  General  Terry,  although  unable 
to  make  further  advance,  occupied  the  attention  of  all 
Hoke's  force,  so  that  none  could  be  sent  to  replace  that 
which  Coxe  had  destroyed.  On  the  21st,  General  Coxe 
secured  a  portion  of  the  enemy's  pontoon  bridge  across 
Brunswick  River,  which  he  had  attempted  to  destroy,  put 
a  portion  of  his  troops  upon  Eagle  Island,  and  threatened 
to  cross  the  Cape  Fear  River  above  Wilmington.  The 
enemy  at  once  set  fire  to  his  steamers,  cotton,  and  military 
and  naval  stores,  and  abandoned  the  town.  Our  troops 
entered  without  opposition  early  on  the  morning  of 
February  22,  and  General  Paine's  division  pursued  the 
enemy  across  the  Northeast  River.  The  total  loss  in 
the  operations  from  February  11,  when  the  first  advance 
was  made  from  Fort  Fisher,  to  the  capture  of  Wilming- 
ton, was  about  two  hundred  officers  and  men  killed  and 
wounded  ;  while  that  of  the  enemy  was  not  less  than  one 
thousand  killed,  wounded,  and  made  prisoners.  Fifty-one 
pieces  of  heavy  ordnance,  fifteen  light  pieces,  and  a  large 
amount  of  ammunition  fell  into  our  hands. 

In  no  campaign  of  the  war  did  such  great  achievements 


1 82         MILITARY  ESSAYS  AND  RECOLLECTIONS. 

upon  land  result  from  the  operations  of  so  small  a  force 
of  men.  Up  to  the  time  that  General  Schofield  joined 
the  forces,  many  days  after  the  taking  of  Fort  Fisher,  less 
than  ten  thousand  Federal  soldiers  had  been  upon  the 
peninsula.  Six  thousand  Confederates,  under  the  imme- 
diate command  of  General  Hoke,  were  to  the  north  of 
them,  and  between  them  and  Wilmington ;  and  Fort 
Fisher,  with  its  garrison  of  twenty-four  hundred  men,  to 
the  south.  Yet  this  small  Federal  force,  co-operating 
with  the  navy,  assaulted  and  captured  one  of  the  strongest 
defensive  works  erected  in  these  modern  times,  after  a 
seven  hours'  fight. 

In  view  of  such  an  achievement,  well  may  all  loyal 
American  citizens  exclaim,  in  the  language  of  the  old 
song,  — 

"  The  Army  and  Navy  forever !  " 


APPENDIX     I. 

THE    FORCES. 
A.     THE   UNION   ARMY. 

Major-General  A.  H.  Terry. 

Second  Division,  Twenty-Fourth  Army  Corps,  Brigadier-General 
Adelbert  Ames. 

First  Brigade.  Col.  N.  Martin  Curtis  : —  3d  New  York,  Capt. 
J.  H.  Reeves,  Lt.  E.  A.  Behan;  112th  New  York,  Col.  J.  F. 
Smith  ;  117th  New  York,  Lt.-Col.  F.  X.  Meyer;  I42d  New 
York,  Lt.-Col.  A.  M.  Barney. 

Second  Brigade.  Col.  Galusha  Pennypacker,  Major  O.  P.  Hard- 
ing:—47th  New  York,  Capt.  J.  M.  McDonald;  48th  New 
York,  Lt.-Col.  W.  B.  Coan,  Major  N.  A.  Elfuring  ;  76th 
Pennsylvania,  Col.  J.  S.  Little,  Major  Knerr  ;  97th  Pennsyl- 


EXPEDITIONS  AGAINST  FORT  FISHER,  ETC.        1 83 

vania,  Lt.  Wainwright ;    203d    Pennsylvania,  Col.   Moore, 
Lt.-Col.  Lyman,  Major  Harding,  Capt.  Essington. 

Third  Brigade.  Col.  Louis  Bell,  Col.  Alonzo  Alden  : — 13th 
Indiana,  Lt.-Col.  S.  M.  Zent;  4th  New  Hampshire,  Capt. 
Roberts;  115th  New  York,  Lt.-Col.  Johnson;  169th  New 
York,  Col.  Alden,  Lt.-Col.  Colvin. 

Second  Brigade.  Division  One,  Col.  Abbott  (temporarily  at- 
tached to  Div.  2)  :  —  6th  Connecticut,  Col.  Rockwell ;  7th 
Connecticut,  Capts.  Thompson  and  Marble  ;  3d  New  Hamp- 
shire, Capt.  Trickey  ;  7th  New  Hampshire,  Lt.-Col.  Rol- 
lins; 16th  New  York  (Heavy  Artillery,  detachment),  Lt. 
Huntington. 


Third  Division,  Twenty-Fifth  Army  Corps  (colored),  Brig.-Gen. 
C.  J.  Paine. 

Second  Brigade.  Col.  John  W.  Ames:  —  4th  U.  S.,  Lt.-Col. 
Rogers  ;  6th  U.  S.,  Major  A.  S.  Boernstein ;  30th  U.  S., 
Lt.-Col.  Oakman  ;  39th  U.  S.,  Lt.-Col.  Stearns. 

Third  Brigade.  Gol.  Elias  Wright.  —  1st  U.  S.,  Lt.-Col.  Rich  ; 
5th  U.  S.,  Major  Brazie  ;  10th  U.  S.,  Lt.-Col.  Powell;  27th 
U.  S.,  Col.  Blackman ;  37th  U.  S.,  Lt.-Col.  Nathan  Goff,  Jr. 

Artillery  Companies.  B,  G,  and  L,  1st  Connecticut  Heavy,  Capt. 
Pride  ;  16th  New  York  Battery,  Capt.  Lee  ;  E,  3d  U.  S.,  Lt. 
Myrick. 

Chief  of  Engineers.  Lt.-Col.  O.  B.  Comstock;  A  and  I,  15th 
New  York,  Lt.  O'Keefe. 

Casualties  :  — 

Killed 184 

Wounded 749 

Missing 22 

Total 955 

Casualties  of  explosion  :  — 

Killed 25 

Wounded 66 

Total 91 

Net  total 1046 


184        MILITARY  ESSAYS  AND  RECOLLECTIONS. 

B.    THE   CONFEDERATE  ARMY. 

Defences.     Mouth  of  Cape  Fear  River,  Brig.-Gen.  Louis  Hebert. 
Department  Commander,  Gen.  Braxton  Bragg. 

Garrison  of  Fort  Fisher. 
Col.  Lamb  ;  Major  Stevenson  (too  ill  for  duty),  Major  Reilly  :  — 
10th  North  Carolina  (1st  Artillery),  Major  Reilly,  —  Co.  F, 
Capt.  Walsh ;  Co.  K,  Capt.  Shaw.  36th  North  Carolina 
(2d  Artillery),  Major  Stevenson,  —  Co.  A,  Capt.  Murphy  ; 
Co.  B,  Capt.  Munn;  Co.  C,  Capt.  Braddy  ;  Co.  D,  Capt. 
Dudley ;  Co.  E,  Capt.  Powell ;  Co.  F,  Lt.  Hunter  ;  Co.  G, 
Capt.  Swain  ;  Co.  H,  Capt.  Patterson  ;  Co.  I,  Capt.  Melvin; 
Co.  K,  Capt.  Brooks.  40th  North  Carolina,  Co.  D,  Capt. 
Lane,  — Co.  E,  Capt.  McBryde ;  Co.  G,  Capt.  Buchan ;  Co.  K, 
Capt.  Clarke.  Co.  D,  1st  North  Carolina,  Capt.  McCormick. 
Co.  C,  3d  North  Carolina,  Capt.  Sutton.  Co.  D,  13th  North 
Carolina,  Capt.  Adams. 

Naval  Detachment.    Capt.  Van  Benthuysen. 
Battery  Buchanan.     Capt.  Chapman,  C.  S.  N. 

Hoke's  Division.    Major-General  Robert  F.  Hoke. 

Clingman's  Brigade,  8th,  31st,  57th,  and  61st  North  Carolina; 
Colquitt's  Brigade,  6th,  19th,  23d,  27th,  and  28th  Georgia; 
Hagood's  Brigade,  nth,  21st,  25th,  and  27th  South  Caro- 
lina ;  7th  South  Carolina  Battalion  ;  Kirkland's  Brigade, 
17th,  42d,  50th,  and  66th  North  Carolina. 

[Regimental  Officers  cannot  be  ascertained.] 

Cavalry.     2d  South  Carolina,  Col.  Lipscomb. 
Chief  Engineer.    Major-General  W.  H.  C.  Whiting. 

[Only  two   companies  of  the   garrison  ever  came  from  outside 
North  Carolina,  and  they  stayed  but  temporarily.] 

C.     THE    NAVY. 

Rear-Admiral  David  D.  Porter,  commanding  North  Atlantic 
Squadron  ;  Lt.-Commander  K.  R.  Breese,  Fleet-Captain. 
ship.  officer. 

Colorado Commander  Thatcher 

Minnesota "  Lanman 

Powhatan "  Schenck 

Susquehanna "  Godon 


EXPEDITIONS  AGAINST  FORT  FISHER,  ETC. 


SHIP.  OFFICER. 

New  Ironsides Commander  Radford 

Santiago  de  Cuba Captain  Glisson 

Vanderbilt "         Pickering 

Juniata .  "         Taylor 

Fort  Jackson "         Sands 

Shenandoah "  Ridgely 

Ticonderoga "         Steedman 

Brooklyn .  "         Alden 

Tuscarora Commander  Frailey 

Monadnock "  Parrott 

Rhode  Island "  Trenchard 

Nereus "  Howell 

Mohican "  Ammen 

Iosco "  Guest 

v  Osceola "  Clitz 

«  Pawtucket "  Spotts 

Mackinaw "  Beaumont 

Cuyler "  Caldwell 

Saugus "  Calhoun 

*  Pontoosuc Lieutenant-Commander  Temple 

*Vance "  "  Upshur 

Yantic "  "  Harris 

i  Sassacus "  "  Davis 

Tacony "  "  Truxtun 

Kansas "  "  Watmough 

*  Maratanza "  "  Young 

Maumee "  "  Chander 

'    Pequot "  "  Braine 

*  Nyack "  "  Newman 

Canonicus "  "  Belknap 

Vicksburg "  "  Baker 

'  Chippewa "  "  Potter 

•*   Unadilla "  "  Ramsey 

Mahopac "  "  Weaver 

v  Huron "  "  Self  ridge 

/  Seneca "  "  Sicard 

Monticello "  "  Cushing 

*Gettysburg "  "  Lamson 

Malvern  (Flag-ship) Lieutenant  Porter 

Alabama     ....       Acting  Volunteer  "  Langthorn 

Montgomery  ..."  "  "  Dunn 

Fort  Donelson Acting  Master  Frost 

♦Governor  Buckingham     Acting  Volunteer  Lieutenant  Macdearmid 

VOL.  II.  — 12 


i86 


MILITARY  ESSAYS  AND  RECOLLECTIOAS. 


SHIP.  OFFICER. 

Aries Acting  Volunteer  Lieutenant  Wells 

*Lilian "  "  "  Harris 

*Britannia   ....  "  "  "  Sheldon 

*Eolus Acting  Master  Keyser 

*Nansemond "  "       Porter 

V  Little  Ada "  "       Crafts 

Republic "       Ensign  Bennett 

*Howquah   ....       Acting  Volunteer  Lieutenant  Balch 

*Wilderness Acting  Master  Arey 

*Cherokee    ....       Acting  Volunteer  Lieutenant  Dennison 

*Moccasin Acting  Ensign  Brown 

*Emma Acting  Volunteer  Lieutenant  Williams 

*Tristram  Shandy       .  "  "  "  Green 

Total 60 

Of  these  ships,  56  were  engaged  in  the  first  bombardment,  58  in  the 
second.     Those  marked  with  a  star  formed  the  reserves. 


APPENDIX    II. 


THE   ARMAMENT   OF   FORT   FISHER. 


INCHES 

INCHES 

I    Columbiad     .     .     .     .     10 

19 

Rifle 6f 

2   Rifle     .     .     . 

20 

Columbiad 

IO 

3    Smooth-bore  . 

8 

21 

Smooth-bore  . 

8 

4         "           "    . 

8 

22 

Rifle  (Blakely)  . 

8i 

5   Columbiad     . 

8 

23 

Columbiad     .     . 

10 

6   Rifle  (Parrott) 

4 

24 

Rifle     .     .     . 

°8 

7   Smooth-bore  . 

6f 

25 

Columbiad 

IO 

8 

51 

26 

u 

IO 

9         "           "    . 

6^ 

27 

a 

8 

10         "           "    . 

6f 

28 

a 

8 

11          "           "    . 

6i 

29 

(i 

8 

12         "           "    . 

8 

3° 

it 

8 

13         "           "    • 

6f 

31 

Rifle  (Brooks)    . 

7 

14         "           "    . 

6f 

32 

Columbiad 

8 

15         "           "    . 

H 

33 

Rifle     .     .     . 

u8 

16   Rifle     .     .     . 

6f 

34 

(i 

6£ 

17      "     (Brooks) 

7 

35 

" 

8 

18      "        .... 

6& 

36 

Columbiad 

10 

EXPEDITIONS  AGAINST  FORT  FISHER,  ETC.        I  87 


INCHES 

INCHES 

37 

Columbiad      .     . 

.         .         IO 

4i 

Columbiad     .     . 

.        .       IO 

3S 

Rifle  (Brooks)    . 

•     •       7 

42 

"               .     . 

.     .     10 

39 

6& 

43 

Rifle     .     .     .     . 

•     •       6f 

40 

Columbiad 

.     .     10 

(The  above  is  the  order  of  guns  from  the  left  salient  to  Battery 
Lamb.) 

Within  the  curtain,  behind  the  land  face,  were  two  mortars  of  5^ 
inches  ;  at  the  north-east  bastion  was  one  mortar  of  8  inches  ;  behind 
the  sea-front  was  one  150-pounder  Armstrong. 

Another  enumeration  is  by  Colonel  Towle,  U.  S.  A. :  — 


SMOOTH-BORES. 

2  1 1 -in.  double-banded  Brooks 
15  10-in.  Columbiads 
12  8-in.  " 

7  iron  32-pounders 

2     "     24-pounders 

2  bronze  12-pounder  howitzers 
6  32-pounder  carronades 

3  12-pounders  (bronze) 

1  6-pounder  (iron) 

2  6-pounders  (bronze) 

1  10-in.  sea-coast  mortar 

2  Coehorn  iron  mortars 
1  i^-in.  smooth-bore 

1  volley  gun  (Robinson  &  Cot- 
tum,  makers) 
57   Total 


RIFLED   GUNS. 

i  8-in.  150-pounder  Armstrong 

3  7-in.  double-banded  Brooks 
1  8-in.  three-grooved 

4  5f-in.  non-banded 

6  6f-in.  single-banded 

4  6|-in.  double-banded  Brookes 

1  100-pounder  Parrott,  U.  S. 

1  5^-in.  non-banded 

1  4|-in.  three-grooved 

1  4f  in. 

1  30-pounder  Parrott,  U.  S. 

1  3-in.  Whitworth 

2  3-in.  banded  Richmonds 

1  2^-in.  muzzle-loading  Whit- 
worth 
28   Total 


Net  total,  85.     (This  includes  Battery  Buchanan  and  others.) 

Forty-six  (46)  smooth-bores  and  21  rifles  remained  in  good  con- 
dition after  January  15;  of  the  former  11,  and  of  the  latter  7,  were 
disabled. 


MILITARY  ESSAYS  AND  RECOLLECTIONS. 


APPENDIX    III. 

AUTHORITIES   AND   SOURCES. 

Copies  of  Official  Reports  furnished  by  the  War  Department ; 
Report  of  Committee  on  Conduct  of  the  War;  "  Personal  Memoirs  of 
U.  S.  Grant;"  "Memoirs  of  General  W.  T.  Sherman;"  "Battles 
and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War  ;  "  "  Naval  History  of  the  Civil  War  ;  " 
"The  Failure  at  Fort  Fisher;"  "Naval  Battles  off  Fisher;" 
"  Terry's  Fort  Fisher  Expedition ; "  "  The  Powder  Boat  Experi- 
ment;"   '"New  Ironsides'  at  Fort  Fisher;"   "Under  Fire." 

CASUALTIES   IN   FIRST   BRIGADE,   SECOND   DIVISION, 
TWENTY-FOURTH   ARMY   CORPS. 

January  15,  1865. 


KILLED. 

WOUNDED. 

MISSING. 

TOTAL. 

OFF. 

MEN. 

OFF. 

MEN. 

OFF. 

MEN. 

OFF. 

MEN. 

i42d  N.  Y.  V.      .     . 
117th       "             .     . 
112th        "             .     . 
3d 

I 

I 

5 

15 
10 

5 

4 
10 

2 
2 

65 
62 
29 
IO 

— 

3 

4 

2 

5 

11 

2 

2 

73 
81 

39 
17 

2 

35 

18 

166 

— 

9 

20 

210 

Brigade  staff :  Bvt.  Brig:.  Gen.  N.  M.  Curtis  wounded. 


R.  Daggett, 
Colonel  Commanding  Brigade. 


